Hitler's War, the Japan Miracle, and the China Model

- Peter Myers. This material was first written on October 29, 2006, but only uploaded to this website , with modifications, on December 18, 2008. Update December 12, 2010.

My comments in quoted text are shown {thus}; write to me at contact.html.

You are at http://mailstar.net/world-war-II.html.

(1) World War II could have been very different from the way it turned out
(2) Hitler's policy of "ethnic cleansing" the Ukraine
(3) Material unfavourable to Nazis in the 1977 edition of Hitler's War 1939-1942 but which David Irving removed from later editions
(5) The main part of Japan's army was bogged down in China throughout World War II
(6) Richard A. Werner shows that Japan's postwar miracle economy was a Butter-not-Guns adaptation of Nazi economic policy
(7) China and Australia compared to National Socialist Germany

(1) World War II could have been very different from the way it turned out

Some people probably think I'm pro-Hitler, because I oppose Judaism. But I'm not a militaristic person; I find war-talk distasteful. I don't like wearing uniforms. Nor do I believe in "group souls", or bans on intermarriage.

Other people write to me tell me how Hitler restored full employment, saved the German currency etc.

But whatever good Hitler did in that way was undone by the war he launched.

Hitler's foreign policy was disastrous.

In some respects, he was continuing World War I. That meant mounting a major war, with great suffering to many innocent people.

Apart from that, there's a certain lack of consistency in Hitler's policy. He did want a war, but not the one he got. He wanted Britain to let him destroy the Soviet Union. Seeking an alliance with the British Empire, he halted his troops near Dunkirk, allowing the British to escape.

Yet Britain was the power which had done the deal with Zionism to bring the US into World War I: l-george.html.

Hitler hoped that the anti-Zionist faction in Britain would prevail over the pro-Zionist faction. He did not know that the Cecil Rhodes group was closely tied up with Lord Rothschild: quigley.html.

William Engdahl wrote in his paper Halford MacKinder's Necessary War:

General Guderian had advanced an astonishing 250 miles across enemy terrain in only 11 days. Then, with his Panzer forces at Gravelines, only ten miles from Dunkirk, orders came down on May 24, that his tanks were to halt.

Guderian's forces had been within hours of capturing more than 300,000 of the best-trained professional soldiers of the British Expeditionary Force, along with some 100,000 of France's best-trained and equipped men. Guderian at first read the order with disbelief. His commander, General von Kleist, stated that, on receiving the order, "I decided to ignore it, and to push on across the canal. But then came a more emphatic order that I was to withdraw behind the canal. My tanks were kept halted there for three days."

The order had come directly from Hitler. The three days pause was intended, though Hitler did not tell his generals at the time, to allow Britain's best fighting force escape by ship across the Channel to England. He intended it as a clear gesture of good will towards his British adversary. ...

He was determined to give England convincing proof of his ultimate good will towards the British Empire, by allowing the elite of Britain's fighting forces to escape to England. ...

The colonies and the formidable French naval fleet were left untouched by Hitler, in his bizarre gesture of good will.

Allowing Petain's Vichy government to hold the colonies in French North and West Africa was an astonishing concession from any military standpoint. Had Germany taken the African colonies in the fall of France, that would have closed the Mediterranean to British ships, allowing Italy free-hand to invade Egypt from Libya, blocking the Suez Canal and the route to the Mideast, as well as India. German U-boats, operating out of the French colonial port of Dakar on the west coast of Africa, could have blocked British ships en route to India via South Africa. That would have choked off vital British oil supplies from Iran and the Middle East, and cut off her access to goods and soldiers from India, placing her naval fleet and her economy in a devastating disadvantage at a time when many in top British political circles, even some in Churchill's Cabinet such as Beaverbrook, were resigned to the inevitability of a peace deal with Hitler.

At a meeting June 17 in Munich, the day France's armistice offer was received, Hitler told Mussolini that he would not impose oppressive conditions on France. When Mussolini suggested the demand that France turn over its naval fleet, Hitler rejected that idea outright as well.

This concession too, allowing the Petain government to hold on to the French fleet, was no small thing. At the time, the French naval fleet, unlike other parts of its defense arsenal, was of high quality. Two new battleships, 'Richelieu' and 'Jean Bart' had just been built. Were the French fleet to be added to the combined Naval capacities of Italy and Germany, it could quite well have destroyed British sea defenses and likely have forced a British surrender within months. The entire American fleet, even had they wanted to come to England's aid, was unavailable. It had been shifted early in 1940 to Hawaii and the Pacific, far away from Europe, in order to defend against a growing Japanese threat.

What could be of such over-riding importance in Hitler's thinking as to justify so extraordinary concessions as the colonies, the fleet and almost half of French territory?

Hitler, after refusing Mussolini's demand for the French fleet, turned to the real subject on his mind -- England. In a discussion witnessed by Hitler's official interpreter, Paul Schmidt, Hitler told Mussolini, he was convinced it would not serve any useful purpose to destroy the British Empire. "It is, after all, a force for order in the world," insisted Hitler.

Hitler's thoughts seemed to be returning to the early lessons in geopolitics he had learned from Karl Haushofer and Rudolf Hess almost two decades before, in 1924, in his jail cell at Landsberg near Munich. Hitler had written then in "Main Kampf," about Germany's future and the need for Lebensraum. "If one wanted land and soil in Europe, then by and large this could only have been done at Russia's expense, and then the new Reich would again have to start marching along the road of the Knights of the Order of former times.

"For such a policy, however," wrote Hitler, "there was only one single ally in Europe--England. With England alone, one's back being covered, could one begin the new Germanic invasion...To gain England's favor, no sacrifice should have been too great. Then one would have had to renounce colonies and sea power, but to spare British industry our competition."

{endquote} www.engdahl.oilgeopolitics.net/History/MacKinder/mackinder.html.

Britain's refusal led him to temporarily ally with Stalin: sudoplat.html.

His alliance with Japan was initially directed against the USSR, but Hitler's pact with Stalin confused Japanese leaders, and led to the Japanese developing a Strike-South policy faction which led (with American provocation) to the Pacific War.

At the time, Japan occupied Korea, Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, and other parts of China. If it had joined Germany in an attack on the USSR, this would have been seen in the US as a war on Communism, and US intervention would have been unlikely because of the strong anti-Communist feeling.

The Japanese Empire acquired Taiwan in 1895, Korea in 1910, Manchuria in 1931-2, Inner Mongolia in 1935-7, Eastern China in 1937-8, Indochina in 1940-1, Thailand (by alliance) in 1941, the Philippines in 1941, Malaya & north Borneo in 1941-2, Burma in 1942, Indonesia and the north side of New Guinea in 1942.

(2) Hitler's policy of "ethnic cleansing" the Ukraine

A reader challenged my claim that Hitler's policy was to "ethnically cleanse" the Ukraine of its native population, even though they were as "Aryan" as the Germans. Israel has a similar policy in relation to the Arabs surrounding it, even though they are as "Semitic" as the Jews, or moreso.

My source was the 1977 print edition of Hitler's War 1939-1942, by David Irving; a second volume covers the period 1942-1945.

There is a downloadable internet edition of Hitler's War, combining the two volumes, of which I have the edition dated April 13, 2001. I thought I would save myself having to scan the 1977 text in, by copying from the 2001 internet edition.

But I found that Irving had edited out much of this 1977 material from the 2001 internet edition, even though that new edition is bigger overall.

I emailed him asking why he had removed that material, but received no reply.

I therefore quoted Irving's material from the Papermac 1977 edition (Macmillan, London).

Originally, my interest was only in German treatment of Ukranians. I wanted to avoid Jews, because that issue is so politicised. I thought that German policy on Ukranians would show even to Hitler-supporters the narrow-mindedness and sadism of Nazi racial policy.

In addition, their mistreatment of the Ukranians (and Russians) deprived them of allies against Stalin. Or rather, made people who originally treated the Germans as liberators, retract that support.

For example, this quote from Irving (1977):

"In the eyes of many Germans a great opportunity had been lost - that of winning at least the traditionally anti-Soviet Ukrainians to their cause. ... "I know that we always used to say the Slav liked a good whipping," said Rosenberg, who went on to complain that some Germans in the Ukraine were taking this literally and strutting around with whip in hand; this was a bitter blow to the Ukrainians' self-esteem. Hitler approved an order Rosenberg had drafted curbing Koch's excesses, but in private he believed Koch's doctrine was the proper one. Goring also supported the tough line, telling his generals in April after a conference with Hitler: "The Russians are an enemy with barbaric methods. We are not going to introduce such methods ourselves, but it will be necessary for us to express ourselves more harshly." (p. 385)

In view of Irving's having removed, from later editions, material which shows the Nazis in a bad light, I decided to provide quotes of additional material from the 1977 edition as well, and cover the issues of Jews and euthenasia.

I should note that I support assisted suicide - I do not plan to end my days with Alzhemier's in a nursing home - but not euthenasia done for "racial hygene".

The 1977 edition elicited high praise from reviewers; Irving quotes some of their comments in his 2001 edition, but I wonder if praise for the 1977 edition can be assumed to apply to the later edition.

One can only guess at why Irving edited that material out. Perhaps the entrenchment of minority lobbies in the West from the 1990s (the Jewish and its proxies or honoraries - the feminist, the gay lobby etc), the spreading laws against "hate speech", the open-door immigration policies, the dumbing down of school standards - perhaps these things persuaded Irving that Hitler was right, and that his sins needed to be screened from view.

Given what Irving wrote in the 1977 edition, it's ironic that he was later jailed.

Readers in North America cannot assume that Australians share their perspective. For Australians, Hitler's alliance with Japan, and his endorsement of its launching the Pacific War, make support for him untenable.

A man who many see as "the defender of the white race" ended up helping evict the European empires from India and the Western Pacific.

Hitler himself felt ambiguous about this aspect of the war, and I have included Irving's material on it.

My distaste for Hitler does not mean that I have joined the ranks of "Hitler-bashers", like the Trots, the Larouchites etc.

A Jewish man who had been a prisoner at the Belsen concentration camp said to me, "Hitler did a lot of good for his people. Mussolini did a lot of good for his people. Mussolini's only mistake was to join with Hitler." conspire.html

Hitler was a mix of genius and foolishness: genius for his rebuilding the German economy, foolishness for the racism and militarism which undid any good he achieved.

F. A. Hayek, founder of the Mont Pelerin Society, the think-tank behind the think-tanks behind Privatization and Deregulation, wrote in his book The Road to Serfdom (George Routledge & Sons Ltd, London, 1944}:

"The relative ease with which a young communist could be converted into a Nazi or vice versa was generally known in Germany, best of all to the propagandists of the two parties. Many a University teacher in this country in the 1930's has seen English and American students return from the Continent, uncertain whether they were communists or Nazis and certain only that they hated Western liberal civilisation." (p. 22)

Hitler's legacy continued after the war: the Japan economic Model was an adaption and descendant of Nazi economic policy, as Richard A. Werner, Professor of International Banking at the University of Southampton, shows in quotes which follow the Irving material.

It also shaped the economies of Taiwan and South Korea, as a result of the Japanese occupation of those regions.

And China used it in part to develop the China Model.

(3) Material unfavourable to Nazis in the 1977 edition of Hitler's War 1939-1942 but which David Irving removed from later editions

{other parts on the flow of the war are also included here for context}

Hitler's War 1939-1942

David Irving

Macmillan, London, 1977

{p. xiii} The negative is traditionally always difficult to prove; but it seemed well worth attempting to discredit accepted dogmas if only to expose the "unseaworthiness" of many current legends about Hitler. The most durable of these concerns the Fuhrer's involvement in the extermination of the Jews. My analysis of this controversial issue serves to highlight two broad conclusions: that in wartime, dictatorships are fundamentally weak - the dictator himself, however alert, is unable to oversee all the functions of his executives acting within the confines of his far-flung empire; and that in this particular case, the burden of guilt for the bloody and mindless massacre of the Jews rests on a large number of Germans, many of them alive today, and not just on one "mad dictator," whose order had to be obeyed without question.

I had approached the massacre ot the Jews from the traditional viewpoint prevailing in the mid-196Os. "Supposing Hitler was a capable statesman and a gifted commander," the argument ran, ' how does one explain his murder of six million Jews?" If this book were simply a history of the rise and fall of Hitler's Reich, it would be legitimate to conclude: "Hitler killed the Jews." He after all created the atmosphere of hatred with his anti-Semitic speeches in the 1930s; he and Himmler created the SS; he built the concentration camps; his speeches, though never explicit, left the clear impression that "liquidate" was what he meant. For a full-length war biography of Hitler, I felt that a more analytical approach to the key questions of initiative, complicity, and execution would be necessary. Remarkably, I found that Hitler's own role in the "Final Solution of the Jewish Problem" has never been examined. German historians, usually the epitome of painstaking essaying on every other subject, to whom no hypothesis is acceptable unless scrutinized from a thousand angles, suddenly developed monumental blind spots when Hitler himself cropped up: bald statements were made, legends were created, blame was laid, without a shadow of historical evidence in support. British and American historians followed suit. Other writers quoted them. For thirty years, our knowledge of Hitler's part in the atrocity has rested on inter-historian incest.

Many people, particularly in Germany and Austria, had an interest in propagating the accepted version that the order of one madman originated the entire

{p. xiv} massacre. Precisely when the order was given and in what form has, admittedly, never been established. In 1939? - but the secret extermination camps did not begin operating until December 1941. At the January 1942 Wannsee Conference"? - but the incontrovertible evidence is that Hitler ordered on November 30, 1941, that there was to be "no liquidation" of the Jews (without much difficulty I found in Himmler's private files his own handwritten note on this). On severai subsequent dates in 1942 Hitler made - in private - statements which are totally incompatible with the notion that he knew that the liquidation program had in fact begun. In 1943, and again in early 1944, I find that documents being submitted to Hitler by the SS were tampered with so as to camouflage the truth about the pogrom: sometimes the files contain both the original texts and the "doctored" version submitted to Hitler. Small wonder that when his closest crony of all those years, SS General Josef ("Sepp") Dietrich, was asked by the American Seventh Army for an opinion on Hitler on June 1,1945, he replied, "He knew even less than the rest. He allowed himself to be taken for a sucker by everyone."

My own hypothesis, to which I point in the various chapters in which I deal in chronological sequence with the unfolding persecution and liquidation of the European Jews, is this: the killing was partly of an ad hoc nature, what the Germans call a Verlegenheitslosung - the way out of an awkward dilemma, chosen by the middle-level authorities in the eastern territories overrun by the Nazis - and partly a cynical extrapolation by the central SS authorities of Hitler's anti-Semitic decrees. Hitler had unquestionably decreed that Europe's Jews were to be "swept back" to the east; I describe the various phase-lines established by this doctrine. But the SS authorities, Gauleiters, and regional commissars and governors in "the east" proved wholly unequal to the problems caused by this mass uprooting in midwar. The Jews were brought by the trainload to ghettos already overcrowded and underprovisioned. Partly in collusion with each other, partly independently, the Nazi agencies there simply liquidated the deportees as their trains arrived, on a scale increasingly more methodical and more regimented as the months passed.

A subsidiary motive in the atrocity was the animal desire of the murderers to loot and plunder the Jewish victims and conceal their traces. (This hypothesis does not include the methodical liquidation of Russian Jews during the "Barbarossa" invasion of 1941, which came under a different Nazi heading - preemptive guerrilla warfare; and there is no indication that Hitler expressed any compunctions about it.) We shall see how in October 1943, even as Himmler was disclosing to audiences of SS generals and Gauleiters that Europe's Jews had virtually been exterminated, Hitler was still forbidding liquidations - e.g., of the Italian Jews in Rome - and ordering their internment instead. (This order his SS also disobeyed.) Wholly in keeping with his character, when Hitler was confronted with the facts either then or, as Kaltenbrunner later claimed, in October

{p. xv} 1944 - he took no action to rebuke the guilty. His failure or inability to act in effect kept the extermination machinery going until the end of the war.

It is plausible to impute to Hitler that not uncommon characteristic of Heads of State who are verreliant on powerful advisers: a conscious desire "not to know." But the proof of this is beyond the powers of any historian. What we can prove is that Himmler several times explicitly accepted responsibility for the liquidation decision.

Given the brutality of Hitler's orders to "dispose of" the entire male populations of two major Soviet cities, his insistence on the execution of hostages on a one hundred to one basis, his demands for the liquidation of Italian soldiers, Polish intellectuals, clergy and nobility, and captured Allied airmen and Red Army commissars, his apparent reluctance to acquiesce in the extermination of Europe's Jews remains a mystery. His order in July 1944, despite Himmler's objections, that Jews be "sold" for foreign currency and supplies suggests to some that like contemporary terrorists he saw these captives as a potential "asset," a means by which he could blackmail the civilized world. In any case, by April 1945 whatever inhibitions he may have felt were overcome, and we find him ordering Himmler to liquidate any unevacuated prisoners from concentration camps that were in danger of being overrun by American troops.

My central conclusion, however, is that Hitler was a less than omnipotent Fuhrer and that his grip on his immediate subordinates weakened as the war progressed. Hitler certainly realized this, but too late - in the final days, in his Berlin air raid shelter. In the last two chapters we see him struggling vainly to turn the clock back, to reassert his lost authority by securing one last tactical victory over his enemies. But there are few generals - either Wehrmacht or SS - who now heed him.

I also found it necessary to set very different historical accents on the doctrinaire foreign policies Hitler enforced - from his apparent unwillingness to humiliate Britain when she lay prostrate in 1940 (as I believe I establish on pages 152-53, for example), to his damaging and emotional hatred of the Serbs, his illogical and over-loyal admiration of Benito Mussolini, and his irrational mixtures of emotions toward Josef Stalin. For a modern English historian there is a certain morbid fascination in inquiring how far Adolf Hitler really was bent on the destruction of Britain and her Empire - a major raison d'etre for her ruinous fight, which in 1940 imperceptibly supplanted the more implausible one proffered in August 1934: the rescue of Poland from outside oppression. Since in the chapters that follow evidence extracted again and again from the most intimate sources - like Hitler's private conversations with his women secretaries in June 1940 - indicates that he originally had neither the intention nor the desire to harm

{p. xvi} Britain or destroy the Empire, surely British readers at least must ask themselves: What, then, were we fighting for?

{p. 12} Their peals of laughter had died to a croak in their Jewish throats, Hitler had jeered in January 1939. "Today I am going to be a prophet again. If the international finance-Jewry inside and outside Europe manages just once more to precipitate the world into war, the outcome will be, not the bolshevization of the earth and the consequent triumph of Jewry, but the annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe." The Berlin newspapers had headlined the Reichstag speech as one of Adolf Hitler s greatest: PROPHETIC WARNING TO THE JEWS.

{Yet Irving shows that Hitler himself wanted a war - not the one he got with Britain & the US - but a war of conquest in the East, i.e. the Ukraine and Russia}

Now, in September 1939, Hitler was upon the verge of world war. And Dr Chaim Weizmann, the president of the Jewish Agency, had wntten to Neville Chamberlain promising explicitly that all Jews everywhere stood by him and would fight on the side of the democracies against Nazi Germany. The Times published Weizmann's letter on September 6, and Hitler no doubt considered it an unorthodox Jewish declaration of war. He often referred to it in later years - by which time his grim prophecy was being cruelly fulfilled. "For the first time we are now implementing genuine ancient Jewish law," he boasted on January 30, 1942. "An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth." And on November 8 he reminded his Party faithfuls of that unique 1939 "prophecy," adding with ominous ambiguity: "As a prophet they always laughed at me. But of those who laughed loudest then, countless laugh no longer today. Nor are those who are still laughing even now likely to laugh when the time comes ... "

While Hitler's overall anti-Jewish policy was clearly and repeatedly enunciated, it is harder to establish a documentary link between him and the murderous activities of the SS "task forces" (Einsatzgruppen) and their extermination camps in the east. ...

He explained that now for the first time, under Adolf Hitler, the solution of thousand-year-old historical problem of Poland was possible: only the infusion into Poland of Germanic blood during the years of Germany's weakness had made some Poles great and dangerous; now that Germany was strong she must see to the "final annexation of the area, its purification and Germanization"; simple merging of the peoples was impossible for racial reasons. But a "Bolshevik method" - which Himmler defined in a memorandum two months later as down-right extermination of the minority races - was "equally impossible." He conceded that the "leading brains of the resistance'' were being executed but this

{p. 13} was not, stressed Himmler in this piece justificative, "a wild excess by subordinate commanders - still less by me." Here Himmler's jottings show a German phrase (Weiss sehr genau. was vorgeht) which might be translated either as "(I) know precisely what is happening" or "(He) knows precisely what is happening." Two weeks later Himmler spoke in a Ruhr city. Here his notes read: "The Fuhrer's mission to the Reichsfuhrer SS: the quality of the German species. Blood our most supreme value. New territories not a political, but an ethnological problem."

This ethnological mission had been assigned to Heydrich. ... According to Heydrich, writing ten months later, the special order directing the task forces to conduct "security operations of a political and ideological nature in these new territories" was issued by Hitler himself. But the order's practical interpretation - embodying what Heydrich calmly referred to as the liquidation of Polish leaders "running into several thousands" - evidently sprang from him. On September 7 he briefed his staff (without any mention of a Fuhrer Order) as follows: "The Polish ruling class is to be put out of harm's way as far as possible. The lower classes that will remain will not get special schools, but be kept down in one way or another." To Heydrich, the prophylactic mission of his task forces was the essential one - hunting down the thousands of leading Poles already listed in black books and liquidating them before they could unite in opposition.

{p. 20} Here at Zoppot Hitler began weighing a course of action as hideous as any that Reinhard Heydrich was tackling in Poland: "mercy killing," or euthanasia. The ostensible occasion for this formal decision was related to war needs. About a quarter of a million hospital beds were required for Germany's mental institutions; of Germany's disproportionately large insane population (a result of centuries of lax and indiscriminate marriage laws) of some seven or eight hundred thousand people all told, about 10 percent were permanently institutionalized. Others were in and out of hospitals. They occupied bed space and the attention of skilled medical personnel which Hitler now urgently needed for the treatment of the casualties of his coming campaigns. Above all they were a glaring genetic impurity marring the blood of the German race. According to Dr. Karl Brandt, his personal surgeon, Hitler wanted between 40 and 60 percent of the permanently hospitalized insane to be quietly put away.

To his suite at the Kasino Hotel the Fuhrer now summoned his constitutional and medical advisers, and in particular Hans Lammers, chief of the Reich Chancellery, and Dr. Leonardo Conti, chief medical officer of the Reich, together with the ubiquitous Martin Bormann; Reichsleiter Philipp Bouhler, chief of the "Fuhrer's Chancellery" (an essentially Party authority) was also present for a reason that will shortly become plain. Hitler instructed Dr. Conti that in view of the war, a program for the painless killing of the incurably insane should be initiated; this

{p. 21} would release badly needed hospital beds and nursing facilities for patients with a greater national priority. Dr. Conti appears to have suggested restricting this program to only the most hopeless cases, and he questioned whether there was any scientific basis for assuming it would produce eugenic advantages. He believed the authorities would be justified only in aiding, for example, a terminal case of paralysis through the most painful stages to a rapid end. Dunng the conference the word "euthanasia" was actually used, but Hitler made it plain that under no circumstances was the real cause of death to be divulged to the next of kin. There was some discussion of the actual mechanics of the program. Dr. Conti proposed the use of narcotics to induce in the patients a sleep from which they would not awaken; but in separate discussions with Dr. Brandt Hitler learned that barbiturates would be too slow to be "humane" and that most physicians considered carbon monoxide gas the fastest and most peaceful lethal dose, if somewhat unmedical in character. Hitler asked Brandt shortly to investigate which was the fastest way consequent with the least amount of pain.

After this Zoppot discussion, some time passed without any results. In fact Dr. Conti had become involved in lengthy discussions with Lammers, with the ministry of justice, and with psychiatric and legal experts, in which the legal and ethical bases of Hitler's proposals were explored. Lammers favored the enactment of a secret law which would protect the doctors and nurses involved in the program against potential criminal charges. The consequence of this delay was that Hitler bypassed both Lammers and Conti, and peremptorily dictated onto a sheet of his private stationery, which bore a gold-embossed eagle and "Adolf Hitler," an order that was both simple and unorthodox, and that considerably enlarged the scope of the euthanasia project:

Reichsleiter Bouhler and Dr. Brandt, M.D., are herewith given full responsibility to enlarge the powers of certain specified doctors so that they can grant those who are by all human standards incurably ill a merciful death, after the most cntical assessment possible of their medical condition.

(slgned) Adolf Hitler.

It was a curious confirmation of the fact that Hitler regarded the war as Germany's struggle to the end that this Fuhrer Order was symbolically backdated to September 1, the start of what he had envisaged as his "first Silesian war." Now it was no longer a local campaign but a bloody crusade in the course of which the German people were to become ennobled by conflict and purged of the impure ements in their blood and seed.

An extensive camouflage organization was set up by Bouhler's Chancellery; census forms, ostensibly for statistical survey purposes, were circulated to doctors and hospltals as from October 9, 1939; on these forms there were separate listings of the senile debilitated, the criminally insane, and patients of non-German blood.

{p. 22} Panels of three assessors then decided the life or death of each patient on the basis of these forms alone. As Hitler had told Bouhler, he wanted a process untrammeled by red tape. He resisted every effort Lammers made to codify the procedure in a Reich law, for this would have led to too many ministries and officials learning what was afoot.

Hitler had been an enthusiastic advocate of the racial rejuvenation of the German people ever since the Twenties, supporting his beliefs with an inadequate grasp of the Mendelian laws of genetics. (In fact, the processes of "negative eugenics" are extraordinarily slow: if all living epileptics were sterilized, for example, it would still take three centuries for the incidence of epilepsy in a population to be reduced by one quarter!) In 1929, however, Hitler had brutally summed up his views as follows: "If Germany were to have a birthrate of a million children a year, and to put away seven or eight hundred thousand of the weakest, then the end result might even be a net increment in strength." On the pretext that - according to some authorities - 20 percent of the German population had hereditary biological defects, the National Socialists had instituted a program of racial hygiene immediately after they came to power; Minister of the Interior Wilhelm Frick was a fervent advocate. In July 1933 the Cabinet had passed the first related law; it was henceforth obligatory for doctors to report on patients with hereditary diseases so that they could be sterilized. From sterilization and abortion it was an easy step to the "destruction of human beings unworthy of life," the program initiated by Hitler in 1939. An elderly Darwinian (Alfred Ploetz) whom the Reich had made a professor after 1933 was to point out in 1935 that "the contraselective effects of war must be offset by an increase in the extermination quotas." In other words, so much fine blood is lost in battle that equal quantities of impure blood must be let if the race is not to be polluted - a pseudoscientific justification which emerged openly and unmistakably in arguments adduced by Hitler in private in 1943.

Frick had drafted the necessary laws concerting the operations of the local health offices in 1934, parallel to which functioned the racial-politics agencies of the Party in each Party district. In that same year, the Bavarian provincial commissioner of health affairs urged that sterilization alone was not enough. Psychopaths, imbeciles, and other subnormals must be sorted out and exterminated. "This is a policy," he added, "which has in part already begun in our concentration camps." Over the next ten years tens of thousands of senior medical officials were to pass through special courses in racial hygiene, and perhaps significantly these were attended after 1938 by senior officers and staff of all the Wehrmacht services as well. Subtle appeals were made to their latent racial

{p. 23} psychoses, the economic burden represented by these unworthy specimens was explained, and particularly repulsive samples were fed and housed at the institutions as walking laboratory exhibits. In June 1935 a Reich law allowed abortions for genetic reason . In the same year Hitler openly told Dr. Conti's predecessor that should war come he would "tackle the euthanasia problem," since a wartime psychology would reduce the risk of opposition from the church.

But it was not until the end of 1938 that Hitler was directly involved in any euthanasia decisions, and then it was in "mercy killing," rather than the infinitely more controversiaI blanket program to eliminate the insane. Bouhler's Chancellery had repeatedly submitted to him appeals from patients in intolerable pain, or from their doctors, asking Hitler to exercise the Head of State's prerogative of mercy and permit the doctor to terminate the patient's life without fear of criminal proceedings. When Hitler received such an appeal from the parents of a malformed, blind, and imbecile boy born in Leipzig, he sent Dr. Brandt early in 1939 to examine the child, and on hearing the doctor's horrifying description of the pathetic case, he authorized the doctors to put him to sleep; at the same time he orally authorized Bouhler and Brandt to act accordingly in any similar cases in the future. A ministerial decree was eventually passed in August 1939 requiring all midwives and nurses to report to the local health office the details of such deformed newborn babies; a panel of three assessors judged each case, and if all three agreed, the infant was procured from the parents either by deception or by compulsion and quietly put away with as little pain to the child and sorrowing parents as possible. From a theological expert Hitler had in 1939 secured formal assurances that the church need not be expected to raise basic objections to euthanasia. Perhaps as many as five thousand children were eventually disposed of in a this way.

The "mercy killing" of the few was followed by the programmed elimination of the burdensome tens of thousands of insane; and all this was but a platform for far wider campaigns of extermination on which the Reich was to embark now that it was at war.

{p. 33} A different aspect of Roosevelt's policy was revealed by the Polish documents ransacked by the Nazis from the archives of the ruined foreign ministry building in Warsaw. The dispatches of the Polish ambassadors in Washington and Paris laid bare Roosevelt's efforts to goad France and Britain into war with Germany whi!e he rearmed the United States and psychologically prepared the American public for war. In November 1938, William C. Bullitt, his personal friend and ambassador in Paris, had indicated to the Poles that the President's desire was that "Germany and Russia should come to blows," whereupon the democratic nations would attack Germany and force her into submission; in the spring of 1939, Bullitt quoted Roosevelt as being determined "not to participate in the war from the start, but to be in at the finish" - the United States without doubt would fight. but "only if France and Britain kick off first." Bullitt was said by the Poles to have carried with him to Paris a "suitcase full of instructions" outlining the pressure he was to put on the Quai d'Orsay not to compromise with the totalitarian powers; at the same time Washington was applying "various exceptionally significant screws" to the British. Washington, Bullitt had told the Polish diplomats, was being guided not by ideological considerations but solely by the material iterests of the United States. The Warsaw documents left little doubt as to what had stiffened Polish resistance to German demands during the August 1939 crisis.

{p. 40} Hitler's attitude toward the Kremlin at this time revealed a fascinating conflict between his short-term desire for a stable eastern front and an assured supply of raw materials, and his long-term, immutable hatred and mistrust of Stalin and communism; his imperial eastern ambitions had only temporarily been anesthetized by the rapid conquest of Poland. In private conferences with such loquacious personalities as Count Galeazzo Ciano, both the Fuhrer and Ribbentrop spoke reverently of the treaties signed with Moscow. But secretly Hitler acted as though the Russians were infected by some contagion which must at all costs be prevented from spreading to the Reich. Contacts between the German and Soviet armies along the demarcation line were prohibited by Berlin. The repatriation of the ethnic Germans was actively encouraged, and at one time there was even a suggestion that the navy protect the interests of the German communities trapped by the Russian encroachment on the Baltic states. How long could he rely on the Kremlin to respect the demarcation line? In his long October memorandum to his supreme commanders Hitler had warned: "Through no treaty and no agreement can the lasting neutrality of Russia be guaranteed with certainty. For the present all the indications are that Russia will not abandon this neutrality. But that may change in eight months, in a year, or even in several years' time." Only the clear demonstration of Germany's superiority in arms would dissuade Stalin from tearing up his pact with Berlin the moment it suited him. This latent mistrust was voiced even more emphatically by Hitler to Keitel on the seventeenth: Poland was to be left in decay except insofar as was needed to work up the roads, the rail systems, and the signals networks to turn the area into an important military springboard; without doubt he was thinking in terms of an attack on Russia.

In a long speech behind closed doors to senior Party officials and Gauleiters on October 21, he promised that once he had forced Britain and France to their knees he would revert his attention to the east and show who was the master there. It had become clear that the Russian army was not much use, he was quoted as explaining, and that their soldiers were badly trained and poorly equipped. "Once he had [dealt with the East] as well he would set about restoring Germany to how she used to be. ..." He wanted Belgium; and as for France,

{p. 41} Hitler was now thinking in terms of the ancient frontier of 1540 - when the Habsburg empire of Charles V had embraced Switzerland and a multitude of duchies like Burgundy and Lorraine as far to the west as the Meuse.

In summary, Hitler proposed to exploit his alliance with Stalin as long as possible and then to attack Russia before Stalin attempted to destroy him. It was plain that Russia was prepared to pay a high price in raw materials for German industrial expertise, machine tools, modern artillery, aircraft, and ship designs. Russia even signed a trade agreement with Britain to procure the rubber and tin needed by Berlin. Nevertheless, to his closest associates Hitler betrayed his true feelings about the alliance. A week after his speech to the Gauleiters, he assembled two dozen generals and admirals for an investiture at the Chancellery, and during the banquet that followed, he suddenly asked the panzer general, Guderian, what the army reaction to his Moscow Pact had been. Guderian replied the army had breathed a sigh of relief, but this was evidently anything but the answer Hitler wanted. The Fuhrer lapsed into a brooding silence and then changed the subject.

{p. 204} Although army Intelligence believed the Russians might have as many as 10,000 tanks, compared with their own 3,500, the Russian armored vehicles were a motley collection of obsolete design. "Even so, surprises cannot be ruled out altogether," warned Halder - with some perspicacity, for by June 1941 the Red Army had 967 ultramodern T-34 tanks on the front, and the Germans did not have an antitank gun powerful enough to use against that model.

{p. 205} Probably no major campaign has ever been launched upon less Intelligence. The services had furnished Hitler - to say nothing of their lower commands - with only the most inadequate information on the Russians. They were certain of only one thing: the German fighting man's inborn superiority. All else was the product of rumor, speculation, and fragile calculations. Admiral Canaris told Keitel the Abwehr had drawn a blank in Russia. Conditions for espionage were impossible. Maps were nonexistent. The range of the army's radio-monitoring stations was strictly limited. Foreign Armies East appealed to the Luftwaffe to intensify photographic reconnaissance missions, as it would take eight weeks to print the maps and issue them to the troops. The Russian aircraft industry was an unknown quantity on which the veil was only gradually being lifted. Recent indications were that it was being expanded at a disconcerting speed. Goring, apprehensive that the Russian air force might prove more formidable than the army Intelligence figures indicated, arranged for a team of his air ministry engineers to inspect the Soviet air industry, but not until early March did permission for their trip arrive.

This lack of proper Intelligence was the root cause of the ultimate disaster. For while Halder had confidently advised the Fuhrer on February 3 that they would oppose only a small Red Army superiority in numbers, 155 divisions, by early

{p. 206} April that figure had been raised (as the Finns and Japanese had always recommended) to 247 divisions; and four months later, when it was too late to retreat, the army admitted it had now identified 360 Soviet divisions in combat with them.

The whole of Hitler's strategy was based on the assumption that Russia would be laid low in a Blitzkrieg of only a few months. Germany's oil and rubber stock would not hold out much longer. ... Goring's anxiety was the weakness of the German supply lines. "He recalled that supply failures had proved Napoleon's undoing. For this reason he has kept urging the Fuhrer to concentrate more on they organization and less on activating fresh divisions, some of which would not come under fire." But far from pulling in his horns, Hitler was already thinking beyond the end of "Barbarossa." On the seventeenth, Jodl instructed his staff that the Fuhrer wished them to study the problems of assembling troops in Afghanistan for an assault on India.

{p. 217} Seldom was a pact shorter-lived than this one with Yugoslavia. Early on March 27, Hewel brought Hitler the stunning news from Belgrade that there had been a coup d'etat; the prince regent had been overthrown, and with him the Cvetkovic government. Hitler's first reaction was that this was a bad joke, but the putsch was real enough: crowds were demonstrating outside the German legatlon, the German tourist office had been destroyed, the Swedish envoy had been mistaken for a German and beaten unconscious, and British flags - distributed by the British legation - were appearing everywhere. There were some Amencan flags as well. Crowds were singing "The Red Flag" in the streets. Serbia was in an uproar; Croatia was still calm. The coup had been engineered by Yugoslavia's air force commander, General Dusan Simovic; a Serb known to be hostlle to Germany, he was an exponent of Pan-Slavism and perhaps even a Russian agent.

{p. 219} In the brief war conference with Halder, Brauchitsch, and Ribbentrop, Hitler had settled the broad plan of attack in the Balkans. "Politically it is vital for the blow to fall on Yugoslavia without mercy; militarily, she must be defeated in one lightning swoop." Goring undertook to withdraw the necessary bomber and fighter squadrons from the west immediately. The Luftwaffe would open the campaign with wave after wave of bombers to destroy Belgrade. By the small hours of the morning following the war conference, the OKW's formal directive was in Hitler's hands: "Yugoslavia is to be regarded as an enemy and is therefore to be destroyed as rapidly as possible, whatever protestations of loyalty she may utter for the time being." General von Rintelen was sent to Mussolini with details for the Italian armed forces.

The attack on Russia must now be postponed for up to four weeks, as the directive made clear. It was a decision Hitler had not taken lightly, for he was well aware of the implications of allowing "Barbarossa" to drag on into the Russian winter. In the event, however, even here fate was on his side: the spring of 1941 had brought unusually heavy rains to Central Europe, and the ground would have been too marshy for the panzer divisions which were the backbone of "Barbarossa" to operate earlier than they did; the rivers and dikes were flooded throughout western Russia. The divisions Hitler now committed to the Balkans would have remained idle until June anyway.

Punctually at 4 P.M. on March 27, outwardly unruffled by the breathtaking events of the past few hours, Hitler received the Japanese foreign minister, Yosuke Matsuoka at the Chancellery. Some 150,000 Berlin citizens marshaled outside in the Wilhelmplatz thundered a welcome for an ally Germany had always held in higher esteem than Italy.

Hitler saw in Japan's territorial aspirations in the Far East a further powerful means of bringing about Britain's submission. The purpose of his present foreign policy was to urge the Japanese to join the fray now, while the British were still at a disadvantage. In September 1940, Japan had occupied bases in northern Indochina with Vichy approval, but she feared to embark on fresh military exploits while Russia menaced her in the rear. Interestingly enough, given his foreign policy goal, during the first five months of 1941 Hitler refrained from

{p. 220} telling the Japanese outright of "Barbarossa" and went no further than oblique hints. We are entitled to ask why, for he himself had emphasized that the Japanese could always be trusted to keep a secret. (The Forschungsamt had long given up as a fruitless exercise the tapping of Japanese embassy telephones, and to German code-experts the Japanese cyphers seemed impregnable.)

It was Admiral Raeder who had first brought Hitler's attention to Singapore, the key to British supremacy in the Far East. Late in December, Raeder had shown him a letter from his naval attache in Tokyo, reporting that certain Japanese naval circles were seriously in favor of capturing Singapore as soon as possible; Raeder suggested to Hitler that this need not necessarily drag the United States into the war and that it would be very much in Germany's interest if Japan became embroiled with Britain, however lengthy and profitless her campaign. Hitler approved the Japanese proposal, but disappointingly little more was heard from Tokyo. He hinted obscurely to the departing Japanese ambassador, Saburo Kurusu, in early February that "mutual friends could one day become our mutual enemies" - meaning Germany and Russia - but this message left no visible impression on Tokyo. In the middle of the month Foreign Minister Matsuoka had however announced his intention of visiting Berlin. Japanese policy had two broad aims - to keep the United States out of the current war, and to prepare a preventive attack on Singapore if this attempt should fail. Japan also wanted to improve her relations with the Soviet Union. To Hitler, these policy aims were inadequate, and he instructed the OKW to draft a plan for wide-ranging joint consultation between Germany and Japan. He rebuked Raeder for expecting everything of Tokyo and offering nothing in return. The Wehrmacht and German industry must give their ally generous insight into all their most up-to-date secret weapons and designs, in the tacit hope that Japan would "take active steps in the Far East as soon as possible," thus simultaneously bringing about the defeat of Britain and keeping America out of the war. In an OKW directive issued early in March, it was pointed out that the attack on Russia would provide Japan with an ideal opportunity to launch her own campaigns, but that "no hint whatsoever is to be given to the Japanese about "Operation Barbarossa."

Matsuoka's personal visit to the Chancellery at the end of March 1941 had been preceded by conversations a month before in which Hitler and Ribbentrop had urged the new Japanese ambassador, General Hiroshi Oshima, to recommend an attack on Singapore. (Ribbentrop had merely indicated to the ambassador that Germany was keeping calm where Russia was concerned, but that if the Reich should be forced to fight in the east, the outcome would be a total eclipse of the Soviet Union.) The German foreign minister wanted "a lightning strike, if possible without a declaration of war," but Oshima said that Japan now felt it must prepare for war not only with Britain but with the United States and that this would take time; the preparations for attacking Singapore would be concluded

{p. 221} by the end of May. On February 27, Ribbentrop therefore cabled his ambassador in Tokyo: "Please use every means at your disposal to get Japan to take Singapore as soon as possible." But the naval attache in Tokyo reported that the Japanese navy had decided against attacking Singapore alone. Hitler still refused to play his trump card - revealing to the Japanese his firm plan to attack Russia; in response to General Halder's urging on March 17 he merely agreed to drop a hint as to the possibility when Matsuoka saw him; Raeder made the same proposal next day privately, but Hitler again refused.

Hitler and Ribbentrop both chose their words with extreme care throughout Matsuoka's visit. The Reich foreign minister only hinted that a Russo-German war was entirely within the realm of possibility. Hitler observed how cagey Matsuoka was about Singapore - the visitor stressed in painful detail how little weight his voice carried on this issue in Tokyo - and made his own most direct reference to "Barbarossa" in an aside to General Oshima at the luncheon given for Matsuoka on the twenty-eighth. After indicating that the Soviet Union had been behind the Belgrade putsch the day before, he noted: "If the Soviet Union were to attack Japan, then Germany would not hesitate to launch an armed attack on the Soviet Union." This, echoed Ribbentrop, was an "absolute guarantee." When a few days later Matsuoka passed through Berlin again on his way back to Tokyo from Rome, Hitler offered him a similar guarantee in the event that Japan should - through attacking Singapore - find herself at war with the United States. On April 10, Ribbentrop was to be even more explicit, stating that even if the Soviet Union did not attack Japan, "Germany might still start a war against the Soviet Union before the year is out; it depends on how she behaves." From intercepted documents, both the German foreign minister and Hitler were by now well aware of Churchill's attempts to panic the Russians into drawing closer to the British camp. But the Japanese response was disappointing - indeed, while passing through Moscow on his return to Tokyo, Matsuoka signed an agreement of neutrality between Japan and Moscow.

{p. 233} By this time the most persistent rumors of "Barbarossa" were sweeping Moscow once again. The first wave of reports that Germany was planning to attack Russia had reached Moscow in August 1940 - perhaps significantly - but it had ebbed during the autumn only to come thundering back in March. Most of these reports could be traced back to the British embassy, but travelers in Germany were bringing back enough hair-raising and evidently significant tidbits of Intelligence to alarm even the most complacent Kremlin dweller. The most substantial evidence had reached Moscow from Romania and indirectly from Belgrade. Hitler had been most frank in his overtures to General Antonescu - indeed, the Romanian leader had positively canvassed "Barbarossa"; and when Goring had

{p. 234} seen him in Vienna on March 5 about increasing Romania's oil output he had explained unambiguously that "one day the other oil supplier might drop out." Goring had asked how many Romanians now lived on Russian territory, and he had made a scooping gesture with his hand by way of explanation. Almost at once Moscow came into possession of photocopies of a document establishing that Hitler had promised that Romania should recover Bessarabia after Russia had been defeated; Hitler learned of this leak by mid-April. At the same time he learned of another, more intriguing leak from Belgrade.

Evidently Hitler had told Yugoslavia's prince regent privately about "Barbarossa" at the Berghof on March 4. In any case, British Foreign Secretary Eden had just told Sir Stafford Cripps as much; Eden had identified his source as King George of Greece, the prince regent's brother. The excellent Hungarian Intelligence service learned of this in Moscow and passed the information back to Admiral Canaris on April 11. In short the rumor was all over Europe. A few days later the unsuspecting German naval attache in Moscow was cabling that Cripps was now predicting that Hitler would attack Russia on June 22, a canard so "obviously absurd" that he would do all he could to kill it. The OKW evenly dismissed all these rumors as a British attempt "to poison the wells" and instructed its attaches abroad to spread counter-rumors that in the first half of May there would be major shifts of Wehrmacht strength to the west.

Stalin's reaction to the warnings was illuminating. At Cripps's suggestion the Yugoslav envoy in Moscow had at the beginning of April warned Stalin about "Barbarossa." Stalin had hedged a guess at the probable date and cockily replied, "Let them come. We will be ready for them!" Hitler's rapid victory in the Balkans iiterally wiped the smile off Stalin's face. An extraordinary periood ensued in which the Soviet government tried desperately to appease Hitler: whereas the Soviet-German trade pact of January 1941 had been followed by a noticeable slowing down of Russian deliveries to Germany, now grain, petroleum, manganese, and other materials began flooding westward, and the Soviet government even laid on a special goods train to rush rubber to Germany along the Trans-Siberian railway. But no words spoke more eloquently than the sensational scene at Moscow's railroad station on the day the Japanese foreign minister departed for Tokyo. Stalin did what he had not even done for Ribbentrop - he made a stunning personal appearance on the platform, embraced the Japanese officials, and then searched out Ambassador Schulenburg and loudly pronounced in front of the

{p. 235} assembled diplomatic corps, "We must remain friends, you must do all you can for that!" He put his arms around the German envoy's shoulders - perhaps he was drunk, for his left eye was half closed, he groped for the right words, and he looked much older.

As if that were not enough, Stalin swung around toward Colonel Krebs, the acting military attache, satisfied himself that Krebs was German, and promised loudly, "We will always remain friends with you - whatever may happen!" Hitler had studied all the reports, including one submitted by the Forschungsamt, on this puzzling Moscow scene, and he wondered what to make of it. Equally remarkable was the studied politeness of the Soviet remonstrance over eighty German violations of Soviet air space in the first half of April (one aircraft had landed and been found to contain cameras, exposed films, and a topographical map of Soviet territory); the Soviet protest was mild compared with Jodl's cynical list of "deliberate provocations" by Russian aircraft - eight on April 17 alone - and his warning about the "momentous frontier incidents" that might soon occur if the Russians did not mend their ways. In fact the OKW was worried about this very Soviet reasonableness. After a secret conference with Keitel on Abwehr subversive and sabotage operations planned inside Russia, Admiral Canaris noted: "After my discussion with the chief of the OKW, General Jodl disclosed to me in a conference that they are greatly worried about the Russians' soft and indulgent attitude toward us, and he added half in jest, in a reference to our No. 800 'Special Duties' Training Regiment Brandenburg,4 'If these chaps' - meaning the Soviet Russians - 'keep on being so accommodating and take offense at nothing, then you will have to stage an incident to start the war.'"

Finding a suitable incident was traditionally the diflficulty of launching a premeditated preventive war, which is what Hitler's eastern crusade had now become. Neither Hitler nor his military advisers were any longer in doubt as to Stalin's long-term intentions. Halder was to state that if the Russian deployments were shown to an impartial military expert he would have to concede that they were offensive in design. Throughout March, Russian troop movements close to the frontier had been so intense, with a heavy flow of reinforcements from Moscow toward Smolensk and Minsk, that eventually Halder felt anxiety about the threat of a Russian preventive action. The danger would be acute at least until April 20, for until then the Russians would have great superiority in strength. "The disposition of Russian forces gives food for thought," Halder wrote on April 7. "If we discount the catchword that the Russians want peace and won't attack

{p. 236} anybody themselves, then it has to be admitted that the Russian dispositions could allow them to convert very rapidly from defense into attack - and this could prove highly embarrassing for us." He had Jodl ask Hitler whether the top-capacity "Barbarossa" transport plan should be thrown into action now, six weeks early, but Hitler was against it.

The Fuhrer himself was in no doubt. Stalin's pact with Belgrade, coupled with a communique of March 24, provided further justification for "Barbarossa." At the end of it all he was to say, "I didn't take the decision to attack Moscow lightly, but because I knew from certain information that an alliance was being prepared between Britain and Russia. The big question was, Should we strike out first or wait until we were overwhelmed some time in the future?" According to his army adjutant, Hitler's decision was reinforced by Intelligence reports on feverish airfield and arms dump construction by the Russians throughout the spring; there were also reports from Polish agents of Russian troop movements from as far away as the Far East, and of the creation and deployment of new armies for what could only be offensive purposes. The Russians were also instructing their commissars, for example in Leningrad, to get ready for a long and grueling war with Germany.

German Intelligence collected concrete evidence of long-range Soviet planning. The naval attache reported from Moscow that the Soviet naval construction program was in the process of building three battleships, eleven cruisers, sixty-one destroyers, and nearly three hundred submarines; most of this fleet would be concentrated in the Baltic. On April 4 the German naval code-breakers noticed that the Russians had suddenly adopted completely new radio- and code-systems for two days - evidently a test of war procedures. After April 7, the German embassy in Moscow observed a steady call-up of reservists and raw recruits. On the eighth, the families of the Russian trade mission began leaving Berlin. Trainloads of the paraphernalia of war were observed moving westward from Kiev to the Polish border. On the ninth, the military attache in Bucharest reported that Marshal Semen Timoshenko, believed to be the only capable Soviet commander, had just held a council of war at Kiev and ordered an alert for all units on the

{p. 237} western front. Rumors swept the Generalgouvernment that Russia would exploit her present brief superiority of arms to strike into Germany, destroying the "Barbarossa" assembly and capturing the huge arms dumps Hitler was moving into the front line. On April 13, Hitler was shown a Forschungsamt summary on the multiplying rumors of war with Russia. On the twenty-third there were fresh reports from Bucharest of immense Soviet reinforcements in Bukovina and Bessarabia, some of the reinforcements arriving from as far away as the Caucasus and Finland; the next day the German military attache in Bucharest reported that the Russians were evacuating the civilian population along their side of the Prut River front and that shiploads of Red Army troops were arriving at Odessa and being transported by rail to the Bug and Dniestr. On the twenty-fifth the naval decoders intercepted the British military attache's report to London from Moscow. A thousand people a day were now being called up in Moscow alone, he said, many of them being sent to the Baltic states. "Our military attache in Budapest, who was traveling to Moscow a few days ago, saw at Lemberg [Lvov] at least one tank brigade ... on the railway line between Lemberg and Kiev heading westward; he passed seven troop trains of which four were conveying tanks and mechanized equipment and three troops." The German attaches undertaking similar journeys also saw many military transports heading west between Minsk and Baranovichi. By May 5, Antonescu was able to tip off the Germans that Soviet troops were massing between Kiev and Odessa and that reinforcements were still pouring westward from Siberia. "The thing worth noting is that factories around Moscow have been ordered to transfer their equipment into the country's interior."

According to Hitler's Luftwaffe adjutant, the Intelligence brought back by a team of Goring's engineers from a tour of Soviet aircraft factories late in April convinced the Fuhrer there was no time to be lost. These air ministry experts had been allowed to tour eight or nine of the biggest Russian factories producing ball bearings, alloys, aircraft, and aeroengines, and to see the advances made by Soviet research. It was clear that the Soviet air force was a far greater menace than Hitler had bargained for - both in size and aircraft performance. The aircraft factories themselves were the biggest and most modern in Europe - and more were under construction. When the German experts attended a dinner party, the leading Soviet aircraft designer, Mikoyan (who later designed the MIG fighters), stated explicitly, "Now you have seen the mighty technology of the Soviet fatherland. We shall valiantly ward off any attack, whatever quarter it comes from!" Years later Hitler was to describe this commission's report on the Soviet air force as having finally convinced him of the need to attack Russia now.

The voice of Ambassador Schulenburg was a lone voice in the wilderness. In vain he interpreted Stalin's sudden appointment to a government post - Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars - on May 6 as a public rebuke to

{p. 238} Molotov for having allowed German-Soviet relations to cool. Undoubtedly it was a historic event in Soviet history, but it could also be interpreted in a more sinister light, as could Stalin's urgent recall of his Berlin ambassador, who a few days earlier had returned to Moscow for consultations. In his May Day speech Stalin had proclaimed: "The Red Army is ready, in the interests of the socialist state, to ward off every blow struck by the imperialists. The international situation is full of unexpected events. In such a situation the Red Army must step up its defensive readiness." Since early May the German military attache had noted the call-up of the youngest age-group some six months early; and now on Red Army orders foreign diplomats were prevented from traveling freely. On May 13 a German consul in the heart of China, with access to Soviet secret diplomatic circulars, reported that six days before, Moscow had instructed all missions to ascertain the probable attitude of other countries in the event of a German-Soviet conflict. On the sixteenth the Russian envoy in Stockholm was reported to have stated that at no time in Russian history had more powerful troop contingents been massed in the west (which confirmed the estimate of the Swedish air attache in Moscow that by mid-March alone 60 percent of the Red Army had been massed in western Russia, particularly confronting Romania). And Antonescu's Intelligence service learned that Stalin was saying that "the Soviet government must accept grave sacrifices in order to win time," because the coming war could be postponed, but not prevented; to postpone it, the supply of raw materials to Germany must continue.

The trainloads of rubber, ores, oil, and grain kept rolling westward to Hitler's Germany even as June 22, the date for "Barbarossa," approached; but the date on which Stalin proposed to resume the Soviet program of expansion, now temporarily halted by Hitler's obduracy, also came closer. A year later, the proof of this was in German hands; it will be dealt with in its proper sequence, except for one episode which can for the purpose of this narrative best be related here. On May 5, two secret speeches were delivered at a Kremlin banquet by Stalin to a thousand officers graduating from Moscow's staff colleges. Among the officials who passed through the Kremlin's Trinity Gate that evening were Molotov, Mikoyan, Voroshilov, Kalinin, and Lavrenti Beria; there were also two generals and one major who later fell into German hands and independently described the speeches to German interrogators with a high degree of unanimity. Had Schulen-

{p. 239} burg - who heard merely that Stalin had delivered a forty-minute speech - been there, perhaps even his optimism about the Soviet Union's designs would have been dispelled.

Marshal Timoshenko had opened the proceedings with a speech and a toast to "our great and wise Stalin." After a formal report by the director of staff studies, Stalin launched into a sober account of the need to modernize the Red Army's weaponry and prepare for the coming war with Germany. He set out these preparations in detail and pointed to certain shortcomings In infantry equipment and tactics. He promised that in two months Russia would have some of the best and fastest aircraft in the world.

{quote} New tank models, the Mark I and 3, are on their way; these are excellent tanks, whose armor can withstand 76-millimeter shells. In the near future there will also be a new tank graced with my own name. This tank will be a veritable fortress. Today we have up to a hundred armored and mechanized divisions which still need to be organized into an entity. Our war plan is ready, we have built the airfields and landing grounds, and the frontline aircraft are already there. Everything has been done by way of clearing out the rear areas: all the foreign elements have been removed. It follows that over the next two months we can begin the fight with Germany. Perhaps it surprises you that I tell you of our war plans. But we have to take our revenge for Bulgaria and Finland. {endquote}

As for the pact with Germany, that was just camouflage, said Stalin. He explained to his perhaps uneasy listeners that France had only collapsed because her army was without the solid grass-roots support of the French people - it was an army without authority. "Girls even hesitated to marry a French soldier." Hitler on the other hand had enjoyed the unalloyed support of his people so long as he was fighting the obvious injustice of Versailles. But the moment Hitler crossed into Russia he would forfeit the German people's support. The partisan movement painstakingly built up throughout Europe by the Comintern since the war began would assume a vast scale and paralyze the German army's supplies. By the end of the first year Germany would have exhausted her limited stockpiles of scarce raw materials, but Russia was a land of plenty. Above all Germany did not have Russia's limitless reserves of manpower. "Germany may be able to build aircraft and tanks, but she will lack the warriors themselves." Stalin emphasized: "There is no such thing as an invincible army, whatever the country of its allegiance." A lavish banquet followed in the George Hall of the Kremlin, with drinking far into the night. Perhaps Stalin was drunk by the time he made his second speech - the sources are in conflict on this point. One of the generals, the director of the famous Frunze military academy, was toasting Stalin's genius for "preserving the peace" of Europe when Stalin irritably waved for him to stop, tottered to his feet, and delivered a speech of his own.

{p. 240} {quote} The slogan of peaceful policies is now obsolete - it has been overtaken by events. During the years of the capitalist encirclement of the Soviet Union we were able to make good use of the slogan while we expanded the Soviet Union's frontiers to the north and west. But now we must discard this slogan for the reactionary and narrow-minded slogan that it is, as it will not serve to win us one more square inch of territory. It is time to stop chewing that particular cud Comrade Chosin: stop being a simpleton! The era of forcible expansion has begun for the Soviet Union. The people must be schooled to accept that a war of aggression is inevitable; they must be in permanent mobilization. {endquote}

In this connection Germany was not explicitly mentioned as the target, but all three of the men interrogated by the Germans said they had no doubt that that was what Stalin meant. (One of them also noted that at the Soviet General Staff college problems of strategic attack alone were analyzed throughout the winter of 1940-1941.) When the director of the chemical warfare academy proposed a toast to their continued friendship with Germany, Stalin angrily interrupted that the German army's victories had only been obtained against small nations up to now. "Many of our officers wrongly overestimate the German army's success. Let's see how good the German army is when it meets an enemy of equal stature!" Raising his glass, Stalin announced a new toast: "Drink to the new era of development and territorial expansion that has begun! Long live the active policy of aggression of the Soviet nation!"

As the storm of applause subsided, Stalin's friend and companion Nikita Khrushchev sprang up and emotionally declaimed: "Never did I dream that in my old age I would live to be given a command in the army of the proletarian world revolution. And now the day is not far off when we who sit here will take the helm and steer our 'ship of history,' not on the slow and stately course we followed hitherto, but ..." Khrushchev was interrupted by an even more inebriated Marshal Timoshenko. Great - if not always sober or coherent - was the rejoicing within the Kremlin walls that night.

{p. 262} To the Japanese ambassador, General Oshima, whom he urgently summoned to the Berghof the next day, Hitler put on the appropriate "anti-British" act. Oshima correctly interpreted Hitler's hint at "Barbarossa" and after being lectured by Rlbbentrop as well, he personally cabled Matsuoka in strictest confidence. "Both gentlemen gave me to understand that a German-Soviet war probably cannot be avolded." Hitler had bluntly stated on the third that he would always be the first to draw his sword if he detected any hostility in an opponent and although he did not expressly say so, his remarks to Oshima implied that while the Tripartite Pact was expressis verbis not intended as an instrument against the Soviet Union, such was the obligation on Japan - and he would expect the Japanese to honor it. Ribbentrop assured Oshima that the campaign would be over in two or three months - he could not say when it would begin, but "if Japan should find it necessary to prepare for this eventuality, then he would advise her to do so in as short a time as possible."

{p. 263} As for himself, operating on the principle that no questions are asked of the victor, Hitler authorized orders to his Wehrmacht - even in advance of "Barbarossa" - which were so shocking that Keitel later had all copies of them destroyed. Hitler's staff, however, accepted the idea that such orders were necessary. His naval adjutant had himself seen how mercilessly the Reds fought in the Baltic states in 1919. Jodl - convinced that Hitler was of impeccable morality and pursuing only one lofty ideal, a German victory - also decided that his orders were to be obeyed whatever their character.

The decision to liquidate the political commissars attached to Red Army units was to Hitler a logical extension of the fight against the tentacles of Soviet authority - the eradication of the ruling classes. The commissars could be identified as such by the red star embroidered with a golden hammer and sickle on their sleeves.

{p. 265} Luftwaffe reconnaissance photographs showed some four thousand Russian aircraft packing the airfields just across the frontier; radio reconnaissance suggested over a thousand more were waiting farther back. On the diplomatic front something akin to hysteria was overtaking Moscow as the realization of Hitler's mobilization dawned: the Russian shipments to Germany were stepped up; false rumors of German political demands on the Soviet Union multiplied; troop movements and the widespread call-up of Russian reservists were noticed. On June 9 the German embassy in Moscow smuggled a naval officer into a Communist party indoctrination session at which a functionary delivered a violently anti-German talk warning his audience to be on guard over the next few weeks. The speaker said that nobody in Moscow had expected Hitler to conquer the Balkans so rapidly, but once the war became a war of raw materials like petroleum and ore, Germany would be at a disadvantage; for bolshevism, the advantage was that any war of attrition must lead to the annihilation of the middle Classes. The Soviet Union's interests would best be served by a period of national peace - while the rest of Europe bled white in war.

{p. 278} A more fundamental obstacle to the invasion was the nature of the Russian terrain, of which the "Red Donkey" had made no mention at all. Hitler had been undaunted by the sheer distances involved, since unlike Napoleon in 1812 he had the internal combustion engine and the airplane - indeed, he had tempted providence by launching "Barbarossa" on the very anniversary of Napoleon's invasion. But in the months to come Hitler was to learn that horses did have certain advantages over mechanical transport. The Russian roads dissolved into bottomless morasses when the rains came; railroads were few and far between, and only tracked vehicles remained mobile when it rained, so the gasoline for the tanks had to be hauled the immense distances from the railheads by relays of farm carts and tractors.

We shall not analyze the Russian campaign in great detail, except to point out where it bore the stamp of Hitler's own personality or of his ability to inspire faith in his subordinates. It was a gamble: he had held forty-eight divisions in reserve during "Yellow," but he was attacking Russia with only ten or fifteen in reserve. However, the extent of the gamble was concealed from all but his closest intimates. When Ribbentrop came on June 27, Hitler laughingly exclaimed that he felt like the legendary horseman who having unwittingly ridden across the frozen Lake Constance died of horror when he learned what he had done: "If I had had the slightest inkling of this gigantic Red Army assemblage I would never have taken the decision to attack."

{p. 284} Japan alone shunned what Hitler regarded as her obligations to the Axis: Hitler believed that with "Barbarossa" proving such a crushing success, Axis interests would now best be served by Japan attacking the Soviet Union. He preferred land contact between the Japanese and German armies along the Trans-Siberian railway to an attack on Singapore. The Japanese were forcefully reminded that their foreign minister had himself declaimed in Berlin that no Japanese statesman could uphold Japanese neutrality if Germany became involved in war with Russia. But Japan viewed Hitler's immediate prospects soberly. On July 2, Weizsacker commented, in his diary: "The Japanese are still playing us along. All we know is that they don't want to attack Singapore as yet. If and when they will help against Russia remains to be seen."

When early victory had seemed certain, Hitler's mind turned to future campaigns. On July 8, 1941, he instructed Brauchitsch not to send any new tanks to the eastern front; the panzer divisions there were to be reduced in number, and idle tank crews were to be sent back to Germany to train fresh tank divisions. On the thirteenth, he confirmed this in an OKW order: in addition to the twenty existing panzer divisions, the army was to establish sixteen more by May 1, 1942 - twelve for the east and twenty-four - a whole panzer army - for other tasks. The next day Hitler ruled that after the Soviet Union's defeat, the army would be cut back (apart from these panzer divisions) and naval construction would be limited to requirements for the war with Britain and the United States. The Luftwaffe however, was to be expanded on a colossal scale, and its factories were to be working at full blast by the spring of 1942. Of his real future aims at this time

{p. 285} we are only meagerly informed. Hitler seems to have envisaged a future war - perhaps not in his lifetime - between the New World and the Old. Later in July, gossiping one night about the Englishman's innate sense of authority, he rearked, "I'm sure the end of this war's going to mark the start of a lasting friendship with Britain. But if we're to live in peace with her, we shall have to give her a knockout blow first - the British expect that from anybody, if they are to respect him properly."

Yet there were disturbing facets to that summer of 1941. Stalin had obviously laid immense plans for an offensive into Europe. The Red Army was far stronger than Hitler's experts had believed. Its air force had some elght thousand aircraft, and Soviet industry was turning out tanks at a rate which Hitler would have dismissed as impossible - had his Intelligence agencies so advised him. On July 15, Jeschonnek's deputy, touring the conquered territones, wrote in his diary: "The Red Army's equipment staggers us again and again. ... They had laid out enormous fortifications, mostly still incomplete, to guard thelr Lemberg [Lvov] salient. In this region, sixty-three huge airfields alone, each with two runways and all still incomplete, bear witness to the Russian attack preparations." The next day Stalin's son Jacob, a lieutenant in a Soviet tank division, was captured near Vilebsk. Among "other proof that the Russians were just waiting to get at the Germans" was, according to the Luftwaffe's General von Richthofen, the huge booty of artillery and tanks taken at Dobromysl. "In part they come from the young Stalin's tank division. He has admitted that they were standing by for the big offensive and were smashed to pieces by my squadrons' surprise attack." Hitler learned that on Jacob Stalln there had been found a letter from a friend mentioning that before their "outing to Berlin" he was going to see his Anushka one more time. Interrogation of Stalin junior and the dictator's captured former secretary revealed that Stalin planned to exploit the German intelligentsia to improve the Russian population's caliber; Europe and Asia would then become the invincible bastions of bolshevism, and the victory of the Communist world revolution would be assured.

As a self-professed weapons expert, Hitler was particularly awed by the new Soviet armored fighting vehicles that crawled out of the forests like primeval monsters of whose existence his experts had breathed no word to him: here was a tank of fifty-two tons, its armorplate so thick that only the Luftwaffe's 88- millimeter antiaircraft guns made any impression on it; and here, south of Dubno, were tanks weighing a hundred tons. On July 4, OKW war diarist Greiner - who again stated that in fourteen days they would be in Leningrad and Moscow - confidently asserted: 'The Russians have lost so many aircraft and four thousand six hundred tanks that there can't be many left." But by mid-July Hitler's weary gunners had knocked out eight thousand Russian tanks and still they came.

{p. 311} "The Fuhrer then turned to his plans for the east," relates the only existing record of Hitler's conversation with Abetz on September 16:

Petersburg [Leningrad], the "poisonous nest" from which for so long Asiatic venom has "spewed forth" into the Baltic, must vanish from the earth's surface.

{p. 312} The city is already cut off. It only remains for our artillery and Luftwaffe to bombard it to pieces, destroying the water mains, the power stations, and everything the population needs to survive. The Asiatics and the Bolsheviks must be hounded out of Europe, this ''episode of two hundred fifty years of Asiatic pestilence" is at an end. The Urals will be the frontier beyond which Stalin and his like can do as they please. But he [Hitler], by launching occasional expeditions across the Urals, will also ensure that Stalin gets no respite there either.

After the expulsion of the Asiatics, Europe will never again be dependent on an outside power, nor need we "care two hoots'' about America. Europe will meet its own raw material needs, and it will have its own export market in the Russian territories so we will no longer need the rest of the world's trade. The new Russia this side of the Urals will be "our lndia," but far more handily located than that of Britain. The new Greater German Empire will embrace 135 million people, and it will rule 150 million more. ...

{p. 314} The Ukrainians, he had said at lunch a few days earlier, were lazy, amorphous, nihilistic, and Asiatic in their ways; they would never understand such concepts as duty or the ethos of work; they responded only to the whip. "This is why Stalin is one of the greatest living men, because he succeeded in forging this Slav rabbit

{p. 315} family into a nation, albeit only by the cruelest coercion." Both Hitler and Koch rejected any notion of a "Free Ukraine" for this reason. Chaos came naturally to the Ukrainians, it was their natural ambience. Half an education would make them dissatisfied and anarchistic; hence Rosenberg's ambition to found a university at Kiev must be rejected. If the occupying authorities controlled the alcohol and tobacco supplies, they would have the population eating out of their hands. In private conference with Hitler and Keitel, Koch emphasized the need to be brutal right from the start if the errors of 1917-18, stemming from vacillating occupation policies, were to be avoided. Hitler agreed. He suggested that the British rule over India must be the model for their own administration of the east. Koch departed from the Wolfs Lair amid the congratulations of Hitler's staff: Koch was undoubtedly the "second Stalin" the Ukraine needed.

"The frontier between Europe and Asia," reflected Hitler over dinner on the twenty-third, "is not the Ural Mountains but there where the settlements of Germanically inclined people end and unadulterated, Slav settlements begin. It is our task to push this frontier as far east as possible, and if need be far beyond the Urals. It is the eternal law of nature that gives Germany as the stronger power the right before history to subjugate these peoples of inferior race, to dominate them and to coerce them into performing useful labors. I admit this has nothing to do with Christian ethics, but the very fact that it is according to the more ancient and well-tried laws of nature makes it the more likely to last a long while." ...

{p. 322} The coming victory over Russia promised to relieve Hitler of immense strategic burdens. Japan would then be free to wade into the United States, which would then hardly be in a position to come to Britain's aid in her final fight with Germany. Roosevelt for his part increased his efforts to swing American public opinion around to supporting war with Hitler now, and he sent Averell Harriman to assist Britain's Lord Beaverbrook at a Moscow conference on ways of rushing military support to Stalin. On October 6, Hitler was handed the decoded text of Roosevelt's letter introducing Harriman to Stalin:

{quote} Harry Hopkins has told me in great detail of his encouraging and satisfactory visits with you. I can't tell you how thrilled all of us are because of the gallant defense of the Soviet armies. I am confident that ways will be found to provide the material and supplies necessary to fight Hitler on all fronts, including your own. I want particularly to take this occasion to express my great confidence that your armies will ultimately prevail over Hitler and to assure you of our great determination to be of every possible material assistance. {endquote}

{p. 323} Hitler had the text of this letter released throughout the Americas, without revealing how he had obtained it; he also, to the intense irritation of Roosevelt, amended the president's salutation ("My Dear Mr. Stalin") to "My Dear Friend Stalin"; and where Roosevelt had prudently concluded with "Yours very sincerely," the German propaganda text ended with an oily "In cordial friendship."

Roosevelt had long gone beyond strict neutrality. Early in September a U-boat had given him the welcome chance by attempting to torpedo the American destroyer Greer (which had reportedly been cooperating with a British plane chasing the submarine); as a result of this attack, on the eleventh Roosevelt ordered the navy to "shoot on sight" any warships of the Axis powers encountered in seas, "the protection of which is necessary for American defense." Hitler no longer believed the isolationists could keep the United States out of the war, in spite of efforts such as those by Charles Lindbergh, who used the American radio networks to denounce "warmongers," among whom he included not only Roosevelt and the British but the Jews as well. Admiral Raeder implored the Fuhrer to permit German warships to meet force with force, since Roosevelt's announcement was tantamount to a localized declaration of war under international law; but after discussing this from every angle with Raeder and U-boat commander Admiral Donitz - as well as with Ribbentrop - Hitler remained unconvinced that the military advantages would outweigh the political risks involved in firing back on any U.S. naval attackers, and his restrictions on the warships remained in force. He was not frightened of Roosevelt or the United States. Handed an American magazine which quoted annual statistics on tank and aircraft production in the United States, Hitler scoffed that the figures were ludicrously low - less than one month's output of the German munitions industry. As for quality, he rocked with laughter when he saw the first newsreels of the United States' two mechanized divisions on maneuvers (the film reached him through South America).

Hitler could not conceal his disappointment at the current aimlessness of Japanese foreign policy, which he had closely followed through the telegrams intercepted by the Forschungsamt and foreign ministry decoders. The Japanese had refused to show the Germans the texts of their secret exchanges with the Roosevelt administration, but in September Hitler explained to his staff that he was loath to put pressure on Tokyo to enter the war in case this was construed as proof of German weakness. By October 1941 Hitler no longer feared this construction; he even somewhat prematurely directed his press chief, Dr. Otto Dietrjch, to announce to the world - and Tokyo in particular - that the Russian campaign had been won. But Tokyo's secret talks with Washington still continued; her economy was suffering from the overlong interruption of the Trans-Siberian railway by "Barbarossa" - far longer than the "two months" Hitler had promised - and on October 16 the Japanese Cabinet resigned. To Hitler's annoyance the new prime minister was General Hideki Tojo, and his foreign minister

{p. 324} was Shigenori Togo, the former Japanese ambassador to Berlin; Hitler intensely mistrusted the latter, despite his German wife. He saw in all this just Japanese playacting designed to assuage domestic public opinion, while the Japanese continued to wriggle out of their commitments for a few more months. The truth was, as he revealed by an aside to Ciano on October 25, that Hitler was completely in the dark as to Japanese war plans. "We cannot expect Japan to pursue anything but a purely Japanese foreign policy," he had also said in September. "We must just contrive to wait until they themselves consider the time ripe for intervention." As for North America, Hitler learned that Pope Pius XII had instructed Roosevelt's special emissary Myron C. Taylor that any extension of the war by the United States would be frowned on. Indeed, the Vatican had flatly refused to pronounce the war of the democracies against National Socialism a "just war"; Hitler learned this on October 7. ...

"The Russian roads beggar description," wrote one of Canaris's aides touring the eastern front. "They are frequently up to one hundred yards wide and people use them as they choose. Their surface is a thick, cloying layer of slime of varying depth: if you drive slowly, it bogs your truck down, and if you drive faster, you start sliding and skidding; despite the width of the roads it is enormously difficult to take evasive action, for all the traffic in both directions tries to keep to the same beaten tracks; as these ruts are very difficult to get out of, collisions occur." As the German troops struggled to advance through this filth and slush they encountered mournful columns of Russians trudging westward into captivity. There were hundreds of thousands of them, and they presented the German military authorities with problems of feeding, transportation, and accommodation they had never clearly envisaged. "The columns of Russian prisoners moving on the roads look like half-witted herds of animals," Canaris's aide noted. Barely guarded and kept in order by the fist and whip, these wretched prisoners marched

{p. 325} until they were exhausted by hunger or disease; they were then carried by their comrades or left at the roadside. "The Sixth Army [Reichenau's] has ordered that all prisoners that break down are to be shot. Regrettably this is done at the roadside, even in the villages, so that the local population are eyewitnesses of these incidents." In the prison camps the food was so meager that cannibalism broke out. "The population," the report continued, "greet the German soldiers as liberators from the yoke of bolshevism. But there is a danger that this extremely useful mood, which is displayed by their great hospitality and many gifts, will turn into the opposite if dealt with wrongly."

The first big anti-Jewish SS action occurred at Kiev at the end of September. The report to Canaris by the previously mentioned aide noted: "Orders are that the Jews are to be 'resettled.' This takes place as follows: the Jews are ordered at short notice to report to specific collecting points with their best clothes and their jewelry on the following night. No distinctions are made as to class, sex, or age. They are then taken to a preselected and prepared site outside the town concerned, where they have to deposit their jewelry and clothes under the pretext of having to compete certain formalities. They are led away from the road and liquidated. The situations that arise in the process are so horrifying that they can not be described. The effects on the German squads are inevitable - the executions can usually only be carried out under the influence of alcohol. An SD officer ordered to act as an observer related how he had nightmares of the most terrible kind for days afterward. The native population react to this liquidation program, of which they are fully aware, calmly and sometimes with satisfaction, and the Ukrainian militia actually take part." There were even protests that some Jews were escaping the net cast by the SS task forces.1

The actual origins of the Kiev pogrom are obscure. The report of the security police suggests that the massacre was a reprisal impatiently demanded by the Ukrainians themselves, since it was the Russian Jews who were reported to have acted as NKVD agents and set fire to the city after the Germans moved in. Whatever the origin, on the last two days of September 33,771 Russian Jews were executed at Kiev. One month later the figure had risen to 75,000.

{p. 334} But a mood of restlessness, of uneasiness and annoyance, beset him. The war might now go on for two more years, he realized; and what would be left of Germany and the flower of her manhood when it was over? Already a hundred and fifty thousand men had died since "Barbarossa" began; a war like this was bound to disrupt the national metabolism, if the good blood was being constantly drained away while the evil and pernicious elements were leading their "charmed" existence in the concentration camps, and all because the Russians had proved tougher than he had bargained for, and because that "drunken poltroon" Churchill refused to admit the mess he was getting his empire into. Thus Adolf Hitler argued with himself in the months to come. From reliable sources he knew Stalin had warned Roosevelt that his munitions would be exhausted by early December, but he also knew - from radio intercepts - that Churchil was moving heaven and earth to start shipments of arms to Archangel.

{p. 341} Even before "Barbarossa," Hitler had realized that German arms production was inefficient. The aircraft industry was beset by prima-donna personalities and producing a plethora of outdated aircraft. The Luftwaffe had no long-range aircraft for reconnaissance or bombing far into the Atlantic or beyond the Urals. The new generation of fighters which Goring had promised was still unfit for squadron service. General Ernst Udet, the director of air armament, recognized his share of the blame and shot himself in November. To succeed Udet, Hitler appointed Field Marshal Erhard Milch, Goring's bustling deputy who had founded Lufthansa and built the secret prewar Luftwaffe. But it would be 1943 before Milch's appointment could have any real effect. In the last week of his life Hitler ruefully admitted that he had erred in so blindly accepting Goring's advice about Luftwaffe matters all along.

Tank design was different. Here Hitler considered himself an expert, and he was indeed far ahead of the professionals. By November 1941 he feared that the tank's useful offensive life would soon be over as the Allies had clearly got wind that summer of the German army's secret antitank shells with tungsten cores. Hitler's still-embargoed other secret weapon, the Redhead "hollow-charge" shell, would soon have to be given its debut as well. All this meant that the German panzer divisions would have to complete Hitler's program of territorial conquests quickly, and this meant building tanks stronger and in greater quantity than the British or Russians could. The huge Russian tank output, and the appearance of the Soviet T-34, had shaken him badly; when Todt now told him of two more new Russian types he had examined at Orel, Hitler exclaimed in exasperation, "How can such a primitive people manage such technical achievements in such a short time!"

{p. 342} Much had happened since that February symposium. The enemy's T-34 was vastly superior to the newest German Mark IV. At an arms conference on November 29, Hitler again warned Todt and Brauchitsch that the age of the tank would soon be over; he asked them to concentrate on three basic tank designs - a light tank for reconnaissance, like the present Mark III; a medium tank, the Mark IV; and a heavy tank (the later Panther) to outclass the Russian T-34. A superheavy tank was also to be blueprinted by Porsche for the future.

{p. 344} While he was in Berlin, on November 27, Hitler learned that the protracted talks between Japan and the United States had broken down. He had a private meeting with the Japanese ambassador, General Oshima, who tried unsuccessfully to warn him of what was coming; two weeks later Hitler admit-

{p. 345} ted to his military staff that he should have paid closer attention to the cautious hints that Oshima dropped. Unlike Ribbentrop, who wanted the Japanese to strike northward into Russia, Hitler preferred that they should thrust southward to embarrass the British. He felt that attacking Vladivostok would not help now, as he considered "Barbarossa" all but over. Indeed, at the end of October Hitler had been against any Japanese involvement, as this would have made the peace settlement more complicated. Militarily, Japan was an unknown quantity. Her population was bigger than Germany's, so she could raise perhaps 10 divisions; but the world knew nothing of any Japanese tank, aircraft, or warship capabilities.

The United States was also evidently having second thoughts about fighting a war in Europe. Several American destroyers and merchant vessels had recently been sunk by U-boats, but Roosevelt had shown little firm reaction. The German foreign ministry answered General Halder's inquiry about whether Roosevelt was likely to declare war with a decisive negative. As late as December 6, Hitler would be shown dispatches from Hans Thomsen, his charge d'affaires in Washington, listing the reasons why the United States would not declare war yet. This firm suggestion that Roosevelt - alarmed at the Soviet Union's imminent collapse - now wanted to avoid armed conflict until his rearmament was ready, persuaded Hitler that war between the United States and Japan might serve his purposes after all: it would tie this powerful enemy down in the Pacific at least throughout 1942, which would give him time to realize his own ambitions in Russia. Admiral Raeder and the hard-pressed U-boat commanders in the Atlantic would certainly welcome such a showdown.

As Hitler's policy toward the United States swung around during November 1941, so did that of Japan as hopes dwindled in Tokyo that Roosevelt would relax the oil and economic sanctions imposed on Japan. The German attaches in Tokyo both warned Berlin that Japan would enter the war before the year was out. Indeed, the naval attache cabled on November 5 that a senior Japanese naval officer had advised him that "the government has as good as made up its mind to fight America. The southern campaign will most probably begin this year." In due course Tokyo would approach Germany for a pact binding each country not to make a separate peace with the United States so long as the other was still fighting. Sure enough, such a request was received by Ribbentrop on the eighteenth; he agreed "in principle," fearing that otherwise Japan might reach a compromise with the United States. For the next week the reports reaching Hitler were conflicting.

Then on November 28 he received one from Hans Thomsen in Washington reporting that Cordell Hull had handed to the Japanese what amounted to an Ultimatum which "is bound to result in the immediate breakdown of the talks." The Americans demanded a nonaggression treaty, the evacuation of Indochina,

{p. 346} and Japan's withdrawal from the Axis. Hitler discussed the implications of this with his political and military advisers at the Chancellery late that day, then sent Ribbentrop to inform the startled General Oshima - startled, for the ambassador himself was unaware the Japanese-American talks had collapsed - that if Japan did reach a decision to fight "Britain and the United States," they must not hesitate, as it would be in the Axis interests. Oshima inquired in puzzlement whether he was to infer that Germany and the United States would soon be at war, and Ribbentrop replied, "Roosevelt's a fanatic. There's no telling what he'll do." Ribbentrop then gave the Japanese the assurance they had wanted:

{quote} If Japan becomes engaged in a war against the United States, Germany will of course join the war immediately. There is no possibility whatever of Germany entering into a separate peace with the United States under such circumstances. The Fuhrer is adamant on that point. {endquote}

Even so, Ribbentrop does seem to have had doubts. On the train carrying them both back to East Prussia the next day, November 29, he asked Hitler what Germany's posture would be if Japan actually attacked the United States; the Tripartite Pact only obliged Germany to assist if Japan was the victim of an attack. Hitler cast these diplomatic niceties aside; if Germany welshed on Japan in the event of Japan's attacking the United States, it would be the end of the Tripartite Pact. "The Americans are already shooting at us - so we are already at war with them."

Some days passed before Hitler's attention was again called to Japan, for he was virtually incommunicado - touring his army headquarters on the tottering eastern front. Only then was he shown the latest telegram from Tokyo, reporting Roosevelt's ultimatum to Japan; the Japanese had assured the German ambassador they would honor Germany's interests, and they again asked for Germany and Italy to stand at her side under the Tripartite Pact. In fact the secret instructions to Ambassador Oshima in Berlin were couched in even plainer terms: he was to inform Hitler and Ribbentrop confidentially that war between Japan and the Anglo-Saxon powers might be ignited "quicker than I anybody dreams"; and he was to propose an agreement binding Germany and I Italy to join in too.

Oshima saw Ribbentrop forthwith, on December 2, and again the next day; but the Nazi foreign minister had to prevaricate because he still could not reach the Fuhrer. By scrambler-telephone he evidently managed this late on December 4. That night Rome was asked to approve the German counterproposal for an agreement, and at 4 A.M. Ribbentrop handed Oshima the agreed text of a German-ltalian-Japanese treaty. This more than met Japan's requirements. It did not

{p. 347} even ask for Japanese intervention against Russia as the price. "Our view," Ribbentrop cabled his man in Tokyo, "is that the Axis powers and Japan regard themselves as locked in one historic struggle."

Neither he nor Hitler realized that Japanese aircraft carriers had already sailed vith war orders ten days before.

Hitler's eyes were of course elsewhere. As winter closed in, barbarous fighting erupted everywhere on the Russian front, where the army's all-out assault on Moscow was beginning. The fighting was of unexampled savagery. On both sides, prisoners were frequently shot out of hand - the Spanish "Blue Division" took the fewest prisoners. Villages were starved to feed the Germans and razed to the ground to deprive the Russians of cover; and warm clothing was stripped off captives. A captured Russian battalion commander related what happened to three Waffen SS soldiers in his area: "When the regiment's commissar, Zhukenin, of the 508th Infantry Regiment, asked an officer what he was fighting for, he replied, 'For Hitler!' So the commissar kicked him in the groin and shot him." The other two shared his fate. A captured Russian order stated that only three prisoners were to be taken in an infantry division's coming attack; the rest were to be slain. Meanwhile autopsy reports revealed that Russian troops defending the beleaguered Leningrad had resorted to nature's most primitive crime - cannibalism. German corpses found behind the Russian lines lacked parts of their bodies, although the uniforms nearby were undamaged.

The cruel Russian winter fell equally on the opposing armies, but it was unequally felt. Stalin's troops were well-clad, skilled in winter warfare, with skis and equipment adapted to sub-zero temperatures; they were also fighting close to their industrial base. Not so Hitler's armies. While the Luftwaffe and SS were more adequately provided, the German army's meager winter supplies were still bottled up by the chaotic railroad system at Minsk and Smolensk far to the rear. Different and feuding railroad authorities operated the networks in Germany, Poland, and occupied Russia. German locomotives were not only the wrong gauge, but their external "gossamer" of plumbing and pipework made them easy prey for the sub-zero winters. The retreating Russians had methodically wrecked the water towers, bridges, and railroad installations as well as the rolling stock. In consequence~ the supply of food, equipment, and ammunition to the entire eastern front suddenly choked to a halt. Instead of seventeen supply trains a day, each army on the Leningrad front was lucky to get one; instead of eighteen, Guderian's Second Panzer Army was getting only three. It became apparent that the German railroads had unloaded their most infuriatingly feckless and inept Staff members onto the Polish and Russian networks.

When at last winter clothing did reach the fighting troops, it was useless against

{p. 348} the Russian winter. Many weeks earlier Brauchitsch had paraded before Hitler a dozen soldiers outfitted with the army's special new winter gear. Only now did Hltler learn that those dozen outfits were all the army had. The blame for this fraud lay squarely on the General Staff. Meanwhile Hitler's armies were trapped in blizzards and snowdrifts outside Moscow - and were slowly freezing to death.

The reverse suffered by the First Panzer Army on the Don at Rostov was a bit pitfall for Hitler to swallow, because now an Intelligence report confirmed that his own original strategy - of conquering Russia's southern petroleum oil fields first - was what the Soviets had feared most. Marshal Timoshenko had just delivered a secret speech to the supreme defense council in Moscow:

{quote} If Germany succeeds in taking Moscow, that is obviously a grave disappoinment for us, but it by no means disrupts our grand strategy. ... Germany would gain accommodation, but that alone will not win the war. The only thing that matters is oil. As we remember, Germany kept harping on her own urgent oil problems in her economic bargaining with us from 1939 to 19441. So we have to do all we can (a) to make Germany increase her oil consumption, and (b) to keep the German armies out of the Caucasus until the oil shortage in Germany begins to hurt. {endquote}

So far, Timoshenko continued, Marshal Semen Budenny had had to wage a scorched-earth campaign and ignore his own colossal military casualties. "This first phase of the war has been decisively won by us, however much a glance at the map may give the public a different impression." The Red Army's task now was to throw the Germans back just far enough to destroy the caches of tanks and ammumtion it had built up for the Caucasus offensive. This would win a few precious months for new Soviet armies to be raised, for Britain's General Archibald Wavell to establish his Caucasus front in Iraq and Iran, for the evacuated Soviet factoties to resume production, and for the American supplies to start to flow.

How Hitler must have cursed the General Staff for having foisted its Moscow campaign on to him.

{p. 354} Despite the strategic benefits - Japan's advance on Singapore and Australia would force Britain to withdraw Indian and Anzac forces, particularly from the Mediterranean, and the United States would have to cut back her arms supplies to Britain and the Soviet Union - Hitler was heard to mutter, "I never wanted things to turn out like this. Now they" - meaning the British - "will lose Singapore!"3 It was after he had returned to the Wolf's Lair, with the "Barbarossa" campaign on the brink of its first winter crisis, that he made to Walther Hewel the remark that has already been reported: "How strange that with Japan's aid we are destroying the positions of the white race in the Far East - and that Britain is fighting against Europe with those swine the Bolsheviks!" His foreign minister soberly warned him: "We have just one year to cut off Russia from her American supplies arriving via Murmansk and the Persian Gulf; Japan must take care of Vladivostok. If we don't succeed and the munitions potential of the United States joins up with the manpower potential of the Russians, the war will enter a phase in which we shall only be able to win it with difficulty." To this Hitler made no reply.

{footnote 3} 3 And see Hitler's revealing remark on the fall of Singapore, page 373 below.

{p. 356} After declaring war on the United States, Hitler remained briefly in Berlin. The public mood was grim. The churches were full - a disturbing sign, but Hitler admitted to his secretaries that there was nothing he could do against the churches until the war was over. As in the case of the "Jewish problem," Hitler felt he already had enough on his plate.

In the east military disaster was looming. The Soviet counteroffensive had torn open a thirty-mile-wide gap between Kluge's and Guderian's armies. Bock's Army Group Center had no more reserves. On December 9 Guderian had warned him: "Something like a crisis of confidence has broken out among the troops." More and more Russian troops and tanks poured through the breach. The most effective antitank weapon, the Redhead shell with a hollow-charge warhead - which Hitler had first seen demonstrated on November 25 - had immediately been embargoed by him to keep it secret from the enemy. Whenever Russian tanks appeared, the German infantry were taking to their heels. The fear of Russian captivity, and the lack of weapons, fuel, fodder for the horses, and reserves, produced a crushing sense of inferiority. Hitler sent the army's ailing Commander in Chief von Brauchitsch to the Moscow front to see the situation for himself. Guderian met him on December 14 at Roslavl; he wrote afterward: "It took a twenty-two hours' drive through the blizzard to reach him. I think he got the most urgent points I made." Brauchitsch ordered Guderian to hold the line forward of Kursk and Orel, but like Bock and Kluge the tank commander knew only one solution: retreat while the going was still good!

{p. 371} These were momentous hours. As his train pulled into the Reich capital, his battleships were in the English Channel. At noon they would be passing through the Straits of Dover, and still the British seemed totally unaware of them. In the Far East, the final Japanese assault on Singapore, bastion of the British Empire there, had just begun. It looked like the end of India, too. In North Africa, General Rommel's corps, nourished with fresh tanks and men, had gone over to the counteroffensive and thrown the British back three hundred miles and out of Cyrenaica. From decoded British foreign office instructions to missions abroad Hitler could savor the harsh mood of realism now again pervading London in view of the German army's unbroken powers of resistance and his imminent spring offensive. Yet his feelings on the coming British disgrace were mixed. To the Japanese he seemed to relish every moment. "If Britain loses India, their world will cave in on them. India is the heart of the British Empire. It is from India that Britain has won her entire wealth." But to his staff he showed a different face. To Goebbels on January 29 he had lamented the sad losses being inflicted on the White Man in the Far East. In speaking to Antonescu on February11 he referred to the latest dispatch from Singapore as "perhaps a somewhat melancholy piece of news." It was rumored that he privately went so far as to admit he would dearly like to send the British twenty divisions to help them throw the Yellow invaders out.

{p. 372} Despite the reverses in Russia, his prestige was at its height. The next evening, February 15, his train bore him back toward his headquarters in East Prussia. Toward midnight, Joachim Ribbentrop came along the swaying corridor with news that Churchill had just broadcast the fall of Singapore: Lieutenant General A. E. Percival had capitulated that evening with his seventy thousand men to General Tomoyuki Yamashita, commander of the Japanese Twenty-fifth Army. To Fraulein Schroeder, Hitler's secretary, the foreign minis-

{p. 373} ter dictated a gloating draft communique for the Axis press to publish next morning. Hitler read it with an expression of distaste. Then shaking his head he advised Ribbentrop: "We have to think in terms of centuries. Who knows, in the future the Yellow Peril may well be the biggest one for us."6 He tore the document in half.

{footnote 6} 6 Yet a few weeks later the same Hitler pnvately scoffed at the foreign journalists who accused him of betraying his own race and conjuring up a "Yellow Peril" through his alliance with Japan. "It was the Bntish who appealed to the Japanese in World War I to give us the coup de grace ... the essential thing is to win, and to that end we are quite ready to make an alliance with the Devil himself."

{p. 385} During May 1942 Hitler's armies regained the military initiative in the east. Only the growing partisan menace in the rear of Kluge's Army Group Center gave cause for concern. Persuaded that Moscow was the objective of Hitler's summer offensive, the Russians had infiltrated and parachuted tens of thousands of partisans into this area (though Hitler forbade his staff to refer to them as "partisans," just as in an internal edict he denied the bombers of Rostock and Lubeck the right to the title "Royal Air Force").

The partisans were blowing up railways and bridges, burning down factories and food stores, and intimidating the relatives of Russians working for the Axis. In the eyes of many Germans a great opportunity had been lost - that of winning at least the traditionally anti-Soviet Ukrainians to their cause. This had been Reichenau's last message to Hitler before he died in January 1942. It was the advice of Goebbels, and particularly of Rosenberg as well. The latter, officially Hitler's minister for the eastern territories, watched in despair as one plenipotentiary after another muscled in on his regional governments - each with Hitler's special warrant, like Albert Speer's for the construction of roads and railways, or Fritz Sauckel's for the procurement of workers for the Reich. Rosenberg bitterly told Hitler on May 8 that with greater tact those workers could have been procured voluntarily; by rounding them up like slaves, Sauckel - as Hitler's manpower dictator - was merely driving hordes of Russians before him into the forests, thus supplying new recruits for the partisan armies. Gauleiter Erich Koch, his own Reich Commissar of the Ukraine, was even worse than Sauckel and quite out of Rosenberg's control. "I know that we always used to say the Slav liked a good whipping," said Rosenberg, who went on to complain that some Germans in the Ukraine were taking this literally and strutting around with whip in hand; this was a bitter blow to the Ukrainians' self-esteem. Hitler approved an order Rosenberg had drafted curbing Koch's excesses, but in private he believed Koch's doctrine was the proper one. Goring also supported the tough line, telling his generals in April after a conference with Hitler: "The Russians are an enemy with barbaric methods. We are not going to introduce such methods ourselves, but it will be necessary for us to express ourselves more harshly."

{p. 394} In mid-1942 Hitler launched his rebuilt armies into "Operation Blue" - the summer campaign that he hoped would leave him master of all Europe as far as Astrakhan, Stalingrad, and Baku. This was the big push that would indeed bring him to the Volga by September - and to the Caucasus Mountains, beyond which lay the Caspian Sea and the Middle East. Yet great though the advances the Wehrmacht now made were, strategically the Soviet command remained the victor as autumn approached, for after Kharkov, which Hitler considered one of Stalin's most costly errors, the Red Army was never again to allow the Germans to encircle them. Each successive phase of "Blue" netted a smaller haul of prisoners and booty than the last. The Russian commander Marshal Timoshenk o no longer committed his forces to fixed pitched battles but instead withdrew and regrouped to the far side of the lengthening German left flank as the Sixth Army advanced on Stalingrad.

We shall see how through the stubbornness of his army generals like Bock and Hoth, and the persisting inadequacy of the army's supply arrangements, Hitler was cheated of the ultimate autumn victory; his armies were never quite fast enough to catch up with, and scythe down, the withdrawing enemy. And when, the Red A:rmy did stand and fight, it was on its own terms: with winter drawing; on and at the extreme limit of the German lines of supply. ...

{p. 403} In Hitler's eyes the east was already a German empire. On July 9 he discussed with Himmler the final plans for settling the South Tyroleans from Italy in the Crimea once the war was over. On the sixteenth he told Himmler he had no intention of overtly annexing Transcaucasia to the German empire; it would suffice to put a guard on the oil fields and frontiers and leave a Resident-General to protect German interests in the "Free Caucasian Protectorates," as they would be known. On the twenty-third he instructed Bormann to issue to Reichslater Rosenberg broad guidelines for population control in the east: the native population was to be kept down by encouraging abortion and contraceptive techniques; German standards of sanitation and public health would not be enforced (i e., the natives were not to be immunized or vaccinated). When Hitler learned that his troops had fathered over a million offspring with Russian women, he instructed Himmler to identify all the children concerned, select those that were racially promising, and "recover" them for Germany; if the mothers were also sound and racially acceptable they could come too, otherwise they would not see their children again. Stiil uneasy at the prospect that in later generations even the rejected offspring might "improve" the Russian bloodstock, Hitler ordered the widest distribution of contraceptives to his troops in the east forthwith. As for education, Himmler told his police offlcials: "I can only repeat what the Fuhrer has asked. It is enough if, firstly, the children are taught the traffic signs at school so that they won't run under our cars; secondly, they learn to count to twenty-five;

{p. 404} and thirdly, they can write their names as well. No more is necessary."

With mounting public unrest over food rationing in Germany, Hitler also ordered a more ruthless exploitation of the occupied countries. Goring told the Gauleiters assembled in Berlin: "Why should we hunger! Let the people in the countries we occupy eat Cossack saddles!" To Gauleiter Koch, his viceroy in the Ukrame, Hltler confirmed all Himmler had said. People everywhere in Europe ate better than those in Germany, he felt. It was setting back arms production and if the bread ration was not increased, he foresaw political problems too. Koch was made responsible for extracting at least three million tons of grain from the Ukraine forthwith; the Ukrainian people were racially "inferior" - they would find some other way to survive soon enough.

{end Irving quotes}

The US and Australia are going the way Hitler envisaged for the Ukraine: becoming mere quarries and markets for industrial exporting countries. And worse, our populations are being dumbed down.

Is there a non-militaristic variant of Nazi economic policy?

Richard A. Werner shows that there is - the postwar Japan Miracle. His book Princes of the Yen is about the role of Japan's central bank in the "miracle" years and the recent "crisis" years.

Werner is Professor and Chair of International Banking at the University of Southampton.

Werner writes, 'Noguchi and Sakakibara were the first and only public figures to clearly identify and acknowledge the true nature of Japan's economic system. They called it the "wartime system for total economic mobilization."' (p. 80).

(4) Hitler's pact with Stalin led Japan to strike south (Singapore) rather than north (USSR)

David Bergamini, Japan's Imperial Conspiracy (William Morrow & Company, New York, 1971).

{p. 700} Because of his prejudice against a Strike North, Hirohito had long refused Germany a promise of all-out military help even against Russia. As for promising to fight France and England as well, that, for the moment, was unthinkable. The Navy was not prepared to challenge Western supremacy in the Pacific until at least 1941, and preferably 1942. The naval development program which Hirohito had tenderly nurtured since 1922 still depended on Western imports of raw materials and machine tools. If Japan could once gain, even briefly, the naval edge in the Pacific, she might take the rubber of Malaya and the oil of Borneo and render herself independent of Western imports. Then and then only would she be ready to challenge the democracies to open warfare.

Hitler's demand for an immediate Berlin-Tokyo-Rome alliance of the fascist states against the rest of the world did not fit into the timetable which Japan, as an underdeveloped nation, had been patiently following for years. On the other hand, Hirohito had long stationed trusted emissaries in Berlin and was well informed on the might of the Wehrmacht. If, as seemed

{p. 701} possible, Hitler would soon conquer the Netherlands and France, then Hitler would be a friend or enemy who could either give or refuse Japan the Dutch East Indies and French Indochina.

In a quandary as to whether to jeopardize the carefully worked out National Program by siding now with Hitler or to alienate Japan's potentially best friend by refusing to side with him, Hirohito squirmed in anguish. In early April 1939 he confided to Marquis Kido that the decision facing him was the most fateful of his reign. If he decided wrongly, he foresaw that he might someday find himself "left alone and stripped of my closest retainers and elder statesmen." He complained that he could not sleep, weighing the alternatives.

The Army pressed Hirohito to sign the pact with Hitler, and the Foreign Ministry advised him to protract negotiations with Hitler as long as possible. Navy Minister Yonai, one of those who would later sit with Hirohito in the bunker on the night of the decision to surrender, tipped the scales by stating flatly that the Navy, in its present state of development, could not hope to win in the Pacific even against the British fleet alone.

On Monday, April 24, 1939, Ribbentrop darkly hinted to Japanese Ambassador Lieutenant General Oshima in Berlin that if Japan could not reach a clear-cut decision as to which side she was on, Germany would be forced to improve her relations with the Soviet Union. That same evening, having consulted with his closest advisors, Hirohito made a final firm decision as to how far Japan was prepared to commit herself. He agreed to a full military alliance with Hitler - but on two provisos: that the clauses of the alliance directed against the democracies should be kept secret and that Japan's entry into World War II should not necessarily follow at once upon Germany's but should be made, in all good faith, as soon afterward as Japan's strength warranted.

On Tuesday, April 25, the five ministers of the Japanese Inner Cabinet met and approved Hirohito's decision. It was agreed by all that if Hitler would not accept the Emperor's provisos, the negotiations with Germany might have to be broken off and Japan might have to wait, perhaps even for decades, before being strong enough to act on her own. Wistfully, a Cabinet secretary observed that Germany, by her "loud talk," had caused the democracies to start rearming and so had spoiled everything.

Ott, the German ambassador in Tokyo, was informed of the Emperor's decision by Prince Higashikuni's former assistant of Parisian days, Lieutenant General Machijiri, now director of the powerful Military Affairs Bureau in the War Ministry. Knowing that Machijiri had been close to the Emperor for years as a palace aide-de-camp, Ambassador Ott, on Wednesday, April 26, nine days before he would be officially informed of the Emperor's stand by the Foreign Ministry, cabled his understanding of it to Berlin. At the same time he discussed the situation with his journalist-advisor, Soviet spy Sorge.

{p. 702} Hitler was enraged by Ott's news and rejected Hirohito's provisos out of hand. He ordered Ribbentrop to proceed at once with the conclusion of a nonaggression pact with Russia. Much talk continued to be exchanged between Tokyo and Berlin for another four months but the Fuhrer scorned all Japanese attempts to hedge, and Hirohito stood firm by his decision not to join Hitler yet.

Reports of Hitler's anger and of Ribbentrop's negotiations with Russia filtered through to Tokyo, and Hirohito resolved to test Germany's trustworthiness. The Anti-Comintern Pact obligated Hitler to render Hirohito all means of assistance short of troops in the event that Japan became involved in hostilities with the Soviet Union. If Germany so much as swapped a stein of beer for a glass of vodka while such hostilities were in progress, it would constitute a monumental breach of faith. All those who advocated a German-Japanese alliance for the sake of promoting a Strike North would be eternally shamed and silenced. Accordingly, on or about the Russian holiday of May 1, Hirohito instructed old Chief of Staff Prince Kanin to activate the plans for a limited border war with Russia in Outer Mongolia. Ambassador Oshima in Berlin was advised to represent the incident to Ribbentrop as a pro-German act which would tie up Soviet troops in central Asia while the Wehrmacht was making sure of its half of Poland.


{Outer Mongolia is now the Republic of Mongolia; Inner Mongolia is a province of China}

On May 11, 1939, two hundred Bargut horsemen under the banner of an Inner Mongolian chieftain controlled by the Japanese, crossed the frontier into the Soviet protectorate of Outer Mongolia, at a point 500 miles northwest of Mukden, near the junction of the border lines of Manchukuo, Inner Mongolia, and Outer Mongolia. The Barguts were accompanied by patrols and advisors from the Japanese 23d Division, a unit of the Kwantung Army. The invaders rode some 15 miles into Soviet territory until they came to the scattered yurts and sheep pens of the village of Nomonhan, belonging to the Outer Mongolian Tsirik tribe. The villagers at once warned their kinsmen who manned a constabulary outpost for the Soviet government on the west bank of the Khalka River, some 5 miles farther into the hinterland beyond Nomonhan. The next day the Tsirik troops from the log fort on the river sortied and drove the Barguts back to the border.

On May 14, the Inner Mongolian tribesmen reinvaded in force, backed by two companies of Japanese regulars. They swept the Tsiriks from the 20-mile strip between the border and the river and camped at nightfall just opposite the outpost of the Tsirik constabulary.

That night the Tsiriks alerted the local Russian advisor, Major Bykov. When Bykov drove up in his armored car to the fort the next morning he found it a shambles. It had just been bombed and strafed by five Japanese

{p. 703} planes. Bykov at once phoned Ulan Bator, calling in the 6th Mongolian cavalry division and a detachment of Red Army regulars. By May 18, he had massed his forces on the west side of the river. The Barguts and Japanese on the east bank broke camp and vanished.


Hearing of the clash in central Asia, Hitler realized that Hirohito was brandishing the Anti-Comintern Pact at him and trying to shame him out of making a deal with Russia. Not one to be ashamed easily, Hitler saw a way of turning the Japanese move to his advantage. Stalin had responded warily to the German feelers for a nonaggression pact and was simultaneously talking with London about the possibility of an Anglo-Russian alliance. Only the threat of the Anti-Comintern Pact and of war on two fronts with Germany and Japan might persuade Stalin to refuse the British overtures.

{This is a puzzle. If Hitler's ultimate goals were an empire in the east, and the destruction of the USSR, why did he not side with Hirohito? This was the critical turning point in World War II: on this depended whether it would be a war of Germany and Japan against the Soviet Union, without US involvement, or whether the US would be drawn in}

Accordingly, Hitler had an icy message delivered to Japanese Ambassador Lieutenant General Oshima telling him that Japanese Army efforts to tie up Soviet forces in central Asia would be most welcome if indeed the Japanese Army was capable of tying up any Western troops anywhere. Hitler proceeded to salt this wound to samurai pride by turning toward Japan a calculated cold shoulder. On May 22, he ostentatiously signed a full military alliance with Mussolini and so cemented the much heralded Rome-Berlin Axis without benefit of Japanese inclusion. The next day he informed his fourteen most trusted generals and admirals that they must be ready for war with England before year's end and that they must not count too heavily on Russia remaining neutral because German relations with Japan had now become "cool and unreliable."

The subtle minds at Hirohito's Court were not taken in by these histrionics or disposed to ignore them either. If Japan helped to neutralize Russia by pursuing the probe into the Mongolian underbelly of Siberia, no harm would be done and Hitler would owe Japan a favor.


On the night of May 22, when speeches about the new military alliance between Hitler and Mussolini were running on interminably at the Reich Chancellery in Berlin, Major Bykov, the local Russian commander in the Nomonhan area, moved a substantial force across the Khalka River to reconnoiter. It picked its way cautiously east through the night as far as the pastures of Nomonhan and there was suddenly set upon by Barguts and Japanese. After a desperate hand-to-hand tussle in the darkness, Bykov's force broke out of encirclement and escaped to the river bank. On May 25 Bykov threw in all his forces in a counterattack and reoccu-

{p. 704} pied Nomonhan. By May 27, having established over 10,000 Mongolian constabulary on the east bank, plus two Russian machine-gun companies and a battery of 45-millimeter cannon, he moved his command post into one of the Nomonhan yurts.


While the 23d Division and then the rest of the 6th Army were being moved to the front in June of 1939, Hitler closeted himself with his generals at Berchtesaden, planning the blitzkrieg of Poland. Stalin continued

{p. 705} negotiations with both Ribbentrop and Great Britain's Neville Chamberlain. And in Tokyo Hirohito and the spy service made every effort to improve their channels of liaison with Stalin, the common unknown in the international equation.

On June 1, Ozaki Hotsumi, the Japanese patriot or traitor who belonged to Prince Konoye's brain trust and supplied Soviet spy Sorge with his best inside-Tokyo intelligence, took a new job as a direct advisor of the Japanese spy service. Since the fall of the Konoye Cabinet five months earlier, Ozaki had had no outlet for his talents except his none-too-competent journalism for Asahi. Now, through Konoye, he became a consultant of the research branch of the South Manchuria Railway, one of the oldest and most important clearinghouses of the spy service. It was run by Dr. Okawa Shumei, the multilingual scholar of Sanskrit and of the Koran, who had organized the Lodging House indoctrination center in the palace for Hirohito in 1922 and had gone to prison for Hirohito in 1934-35 for his managerial role in the 1932 assassinations.

On June 9, a week after Ozaki had begun work for Dr. Okawa, Big Brother Marquis Kido, now home minister in charge of police, met with his Red contact, Saionji Kinkazu, the grandson of the aged, impotent prime-minister-maker. Kido and Saionji talked alone for the first time since the outbreak of the Lake Khasan incident a year earlier. The next week Soviet spy Sorge filed a detailed intelligence report to Moscow, assuring Stalin that the Japanese buildup at Nomonhan portended no war but only a military exercise and a limited probe of Russian strength. Sorge was able to substantiate his assertions by giving evidence that new Japanese divisions were being shipped out, not battle-ready to Manchuria but green and ill-equipped for garrison duty in central China.

Stalin was understandably suspicious of the intelligence coming from Sorge in Tokyo, and in early July he appointed one of his most trustworthy and brilliant generals to command the Russian forces on the Mongolian frontier opposite the continuing Japanese troop buildup. This was Lieutenant General Georgi Zhukov, a specialist in tanks and armor who would later become a field marshal and would share with Eisenhower in the laurels for the conquest of Germany. On reviewing the situation in the Nomonhan area, Zhukov asked the Kremlin for full support in repulsing what might well be an all-out Japanese attack. Stalin responded by giving Zhukov all the troops and equipment that could be spared and by suggesting to Hitler, on July 18, that after all Russia might be willing to conclude a nonaggression pact.


On assuming his command, Lieutenant General Zhukov organized a classic of positional defense. He beat off half a dozen Japanese attempts to cross the Khalka River in the second and third weeks of July and began

{p. 706} to build up gradually a reserve force behind his lines with which to take the offensive.

On July 19, in a night of fire, Zhukov's men withstood the best offensive which the Japanese forces in the area could muster. By July 24, Zhukov's first probing counterattacks had become so blistering that Lieutenant Higashikuni, the twenty-three-year-old son of Prince Higashikuni, decamped without orders from the field of battle. He waited in a town behind the lines for a reposting to a quieter theater. His new orders came through a week later and his equerry took full responsibility for having advised him to desert. His comrades in the field muttered over his exemption from normal discipline, but the story was suppressed by the censors and few of his tentmates lived to carry it home to Japan. The commander of the 23rd Division took the imperial desertion as an ill omen, but being committed fatalistically to the Strike-North concept, he only drove on his men so much the harder.

Soviet commander Zhukov knew precisely from Sorge's intelligence what forces the Japanese had committed to the war, and all through July and early August he methodically assembled behind his lines an absolute superiority over them - a superiority of three to two in manpower, two to one in planes and artillery, and four to one in armor.


During Zhukov's preparations, Hitler and Stalin negotiated and, on August 19, 1939, agreed to sign their mutual Non-Aggression Pact. It pledged both Germany and Russia to refrain from making war on one another no matter what their respective commitments to other nations individually.

The next morning at 5:45 Zhukov launched his offensive. He had ready 500 tanks, 500 planes, 346 armored cars, and almost 80,000 men. He threw them all into the strip of territory 40 miles wide and 20 miles deep which the Japanese had occupied between the Khalka River and the Mongolian-Manchurian border. Heavy flame-throwing Russian tanks led the way, spewing before them burning petroleum with a prodigality that the oil-poor Japanese could scarcely imagine. Never until the Pacific War would the samurai be given such a lesson in technology. And never at any time would they fight back more fanatically. It took Zhukov's tanks eleven days to roll the twenty miles to the border and 20,000 of the 60,000 Japanese defenders died in front of them. More than 50,000 of the 60,000 were counted afterward as wounded, dead, or missing in action.

{p. 707} Six years later, talking to Eisenhower's Chief of Staff Bedell Smith, Zhukov described the Russian triumph with low-keyed but callous braggadocio: "The Japanese are not good against armor. It took about ten days to beat them."

At the time of Zhukov's breakthrough, on August 23, Hitler summoned a meeting of his generals to explain his Non-Aggression Pact with Russia and his disregard for the Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan. "The [Japanese] Emperor," he shouted, "is a companion piece for the late czars of Russia. He is weak, cowardly, and irresolute and may be easily toppled by revolution.... Let us think of ourselves as masters and consider these people at best as lacquered half-monkeys, who need to feel the knout."

Hirohito did not hear these words until he read them in a book in 1957. Had he heard them at the time, it would have made little difference, for he had already determined through Nomonhan and Hitler's Non-Aggression Pact with Russia that he must exploit Hitler's strength if he could and must trust it never.

On August 31, after their ten-day offensive, the Russian tanks in central Asia drew up and stopped at the Manchurian border. Their guns were pointed east toward Tokyo. The Kwantung Army was rushing all its reserves to the front to contest their further advance. Zhukov paused, fearing a trap. And before morning he had received orders to release his heaviest armor and send it scurrying back toward the nearest railheads for express transportation west toward Poland.

On September 1, Hitler's Wehrmacht poured into western Poland to begin the rape of Warsaw. Bound by treaty and ashamed of the concessions made at Munich seventeen months earlier, Great Britain and the nations of the British Commonwealth at once declared war on Germany. The Red Army began the next week to occupy eastern Poland. In a back street outside the Kremlin in Moscow, Soviet and Japanese foreign officers began serious negotiations for settlement of the Nomonhan incident.


News of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact, turning the Wehrmacht loose on the democratic world, had reached Tokyo on August 22, 1939, the night before Zhukov's breakthrough at Nomonhan and Hitler's contemptuous speech about Japan to his generals. Big Brother Kido, the home minister, wrote in his diary: "However we consider the Anti-Comintern Pact and its attached secret protocols, we are startled that there has been this breach of faith." Prime Minister Hiranuma, who had lent qualified support to the strengthening of Japan's pact with Germany, considered the sudden turn in German diplomacy "intricate and baffling." He promptly tendered Hirohito his resignation and Hirohito accepted it.

Now, at last, the problems of many months had been solved. Hitler

{p. 708} might be angry, but he owed Japan a favor and had implicitly set Japan free to abide by her own timetable in the Far East. Japan had suffered a great loss of face at Nomonhan, but the Strike-North Faction in the Army had suffered a decisive defeat at the hands of the Russians and had learned that promises of alliance made by Hitler were worth nothing.

Hirohito had sent the vice chief of staff, his former aide-de-camp, Lieutenant General Nakajima Tetsuzo, to the Nomonhan front on September 1 to bring about an end to hostilities. The officers of the Kwantung Army had begged to be allowed to mount one more counteroffensive on September 10 if only to save Japan's face. Nakajima had flown back to Japan, talked to the Emperor, flown again to Nomonhan, and suppressed the plans for the counteroffensive. Hirohito replaced the commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria, and on September 16 the Russian and Japanese diplomats meeting in Moscow agreed to settle the war by a return to the border lines of the status quo ante.

Lieutenant General Komatsubara Michitaro, the Strike-North commander of Japan's 23d Division, which had suffered 99 per cent casualties at Nomonhan, returned to Japan to die of an "abdominal ailment." Several officers of lesser rank blew their brains out or committed hara-kiri on the edge of the field of battle.

The Strike-North Faction which had troubled Hirohito since 1930 was dead at last. And for the next year Hirohito would be able to develop his private national plans in peace and quiet. The factories would hum with armament business. The quixotic liberals of Japan would continue to murmur, making it necessary to change the Cabinet occasionally. But the secret police would ably nullify all serious attempts at protest. And Prince Konoye, in retirement, would arrange to replace all previous political parties with a single mass party called the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. Germany in the meanwhile would march, and when the time was ripe Prince Konoye would resume office to lead Japan once again to war.




Between August 1939 and August 1940, patriotic Japanese almost forgot their favorite hobby of domestic political intrigue while they worked feverishly to prepare the country for World War II before Germany should fight and win it. Starts were made on over a thousand new military airplanes and over a million and a quarter tons of new or converted naval vessels. Twelve new divisions and a quarter of a million men were added to the Army. ...

{end quotes from Bergamini}

(5) The main part of Japan's army was bogged down in China throughout World War II

Just as we erroneously "remember" the European part of WWII, as "America defeating Germany", when in fact most of the fighting was done on the Eastern front, so, the importance of China is "written out" of the way we remember WWII in the Pacific.

Edwin P. Hoyt shows that the bulk of Japan's army, and its best part the Kwantung Army, was tied down in China and on the Soviet Border throughout the war. If it had been freed up, the results could have been quite different. For example, Japan could have conquered Australia before the Americans got here.

I don't know any Australians who wish that Japan had won the war.

Edwin P. Hoyt, Japan's War: the Great Pacific Conflict (Hutchinson, London, 1986).

{p. 45} With the eruption of war in Europe in the summer of 1914, Japan was constrained by her alliance with Britain to take the side of the Triple Entente. The Japanese were delighted to do so because it gave them a new opportunity to seize territory. It took only two months for the Japanese to seize the German colony of Kiaochao in China's Shantung Province. Japan then moved into the German Pacific colonies. They took the Mariana Islands and the Marshalls without much trouble. They moved into the Caroline Islands. They coveted German New Guinea, but the Australians got there first, and the New Zealanders moved into German Samoa before the Japanese could.

The Japanese navy cruised the Pacific in search of German warships, but Admiral von Spee's German East Asia Cruiser Squadron had headed to Cape Horn to try to cross the Atlantic and make the run back to Germany, a gamble that failed. Japan then had no further part in the great war except to provide supplies, and she could enjoy her captures.

Japanese expansionists in the army, navy, and foreign office then concentrated their efforts to colonize China in furtherance of Lord Hatta's Memorial to the Throne of 1858. The time had come: the European powers were preoccupied as Hotta had said they would be. In 1915 Japan presented the infamous "Twenty-One Demands" to the Chinese government. These demands would give Japan a ninety-nine-year lease on the southern Manchuria railroads, economic control of Manchuria, the old German colony of Kiaochao, the German rights in Shanghai, economic control of mines at Hankow, and the employment of political advisors to the Chinese go ernment and special concessions in China, which would have made China a colony of Japan.

The Chinese flatly refused to discuss any interference with their government. The Japanese government then ordered mobilization of the troops and gave China an ultimatum: the other demands of the troops would be accepted or ...

The Chinese capitulated. Japan moved her army into Manchuria and outer Mongolia. She established a military presence in Shanghai. She held onto Kiaochao. Now she had Korea, economic control of Manchuria, Taiwan, the Kuriles, Ryukyus, and a string of islands in the Central and South Pacific that would provide naval bases, and the Marianas which were valuable agriculturally as well. Japan had taken one more giant step in her drive for empire and preeminence in Asia.

{p. 46} What happened next is vital in the history of Japan's drive in the 1930s, and in the current situation between Japan and the USSR in the 1980s:

So preoccupied with the war in Europe were the Allies, and ultimately the United States, that the Japanese were able to consolidate their territorial gains between 1915 and 1919. All this was done very quietly, through secret agreements signed with all powers but the United States.

The Japanese tried to come to a similar agreement with the Americans, but failed: Washington had the "Open Door" to think about, which meant American businessmen insisted on keeping their options to trade with China open.

Meanwhile, the Japanese became China's bankers, and in exchange for their loans, they secured new areas of economic exploitation, all the while claiming loudly that they stood for nonintervention in the affairs of China.

In 1917 as Russia crumbled into revolution, Britain urged the United States and Japan to mount a joint expeditionary force that would land in Siberia and secure the Trans-Siberian Railway all the way to Moscow. The Japanese army opposed the plan. But when the Japanese realized that Siberia was loaded with military supplies, which might fall into the hands of the revolutionary government, the army and the navy moved. In January 1918, two Japanese warships appeared at Vladivostok to "protect" the foreign consular corps.

General Giichi Tanaka, a specialist in Russian affairs, recommended that the question of the foreign residents be used as an excuse to send two divisions of Japanese troops to Siberia to wipe out the Bolshevik forces. The foreign ministry supported the plan but said it had to be "self-defense." So "self-defense" it became. The Japanese assembled a force to operate in northern Manchuria, Mongolia, and Siberia. Their rear would be protected by the Kwantung (the Japanese name for Liaotung) Army in southern Manchuria. The American government, preoccupied with the desire to create a new Europe, suggested that the Japanese send troops to help the Czechslovak legions - Austrian prisoners of war captured by the Russians, who had broken out of their prison camps and moved along the Trans-Siberian Railway to Siberia. It was just the excuse Japan wanted, and the occupation of Siberia was on.

The Japanese cabinet promised the Allies that only 12,000 troops

{p. 47} would be sent. The army was furious. Here had been a chance to saw off Siberia and add another chunk of empire, a chance muffed by the civilian government. Ultimately the army triumphed and three and a half divisions were sent to Siberia.

The presence of this huge force in Siberia became a Japanese lever at the Paris Peace Conference.

The Allied powers approached the surrender of Germany with the high hope that they could outlaw war as an instrument of national policy. In Japan, too, there was a strong peace movement, welling from the universities and the political parties. Not so in the inner circle of Japan's leadership. The aspirations of the oligarchy and of the army had never changed. Japan was to build more empire and take the leadership of Asia first of all. Hakko ichiu.

Now that Japan had joined the exploiters, the colonial nations of the world in pursuit of prestige and power, the Japanese wanted to be treated as equals in all ways. Asahi Shimbun, the largest Japanese newspaper, noted at the opening of the conference that racial in equality was the greatest issue among nations and called upon Japan to lead all the colored peoples of the world in seeking equality.

But the race prejudice of the Westerners, and particularly of the Americans and the British, was so deep-seated that the concession that "all men are brothers" could not be made at the Paris peace talks, although Japan fought to the end for provisions that would provide for racial equality.

When the Americans stalled and wriggled on the issue, even the most open-minded Japanese lost faith in the sincerity of the Westerners. The issue became intermingled with the color issue in America and bogged down completely. Japan had agreed to participate in the League of Nations, but it became a matter of national honor that they do so on an equal basis with all others. The issue was sloughed off, but, in fact, it was the most important aspect of the peace conference. Everything that happened toward the end was influenced by the Japanese perception of Western powers trying to misuse her and even cheat her of the fruits of her "victory" over Germany. To this was added fuel to the growing distrust of the United States when the Americans, having done so much to manage Pacific affairs in the peace conferences, refused to join the League of Nations.

{p. 51} The army and the navy continued to spend huge sums of money to build divisions and ships. The army's excuse was the need to police Korea and Manchuria. The Kwantung Army by 1920 had become the strongest and most powerful military force of Japan. Situated so far from Tokyo the Kwantung Army command enjoyed a greater freedom than any other unit of the Japanese military. When the Japanese forces were withdrawn from Siberia in 1922, the problem arose as to what was to be done with these divisions.

{p. 60} The sense of well-being and peace deserted Japan in 1927 when a financial panic was followed by severe economic depression. The Japanese slump was then followed by the international collapse of 1929 and the subsequent world depression. One of the most severe trials to the Japanese was the death of the raw silk market in America and Europe. Silkworm culture was the province of most farm wives in Japan, and sale of silk meant the difference in the best of times between subsistence and a little luxury. In the late 1920s hardship hit the farmers of Japan. University graduates, coming out of their own cocoons, found that only a fifth of them could get jobs. The others roamed the streets and in bitter desperation began joining radical political groups. The police began staging raids on radical organizations and jailed thousands of dissenters.

As the country wallowed in depression, the soldiers and the sailors learned of the plights of their families and grew ever angrier. Among the military men, the civilian government of Japan was thoroughly discredited, and the "democracy" spoken of so glowingly after the defeat of Germany had now become little more than a dirty word. The solution to Japan's woes, said the generals of the kodo ha, was to take over Manchuria. This fabulous grain bowl, with its water power and coal and iron ores, was the colony that would solve all Japan's economic woes and provide the base for expansion into Mongolia and China.

In 1927 General Giichi Tanaka became prime minister of Japan. He was president of the Seiyukai party, but his principal advisor on foreign affairs was Kaku Mori, a civilian, the real power of the party. General Tanaka now came out openly with a policy designed to take over Manchuria. He made a trip to Mukden, to meet with all the officials of the various Japanese enterprises in Manchuria and Mongolia. A report that purported to be an account of this meeting was later published by a Shanghai newspaper, but the Japanese denied it.

It was real. Tanaka announced an eight-point program, two of the points concealed from the public. One of these said that Japan would support any regime in Manchuria that would guarantee Japan's special economic and military positions there. The other said that if

{p. 61} any problems arose in Manchuria or Mongolia that affected Japanese interests, Japan would act.

Noyuboshi Muto, a moderate general who attended the meeting, asked Prime Minister Tanaka if he was sure of what he was saying:

Muto: If this program is carried out, it is bound to precipitate war between Japan and the United States. Are you prepared to risk a war with the United States, or even a World War? Tanaka: I am determined to cope with whatever consequences this policy may bring. Muto: Are you sure that your determination will not falter? Tanaka: I will not falter. Muto: Since the government has the determination, we will obey orders and say nothing.

1927. Mukden. The army knew precisely where it was going. The only question was, when?

{p. 62} Now came the first overt acts of the supernationalists who were determined to colonize Manchuria and other parts of China. There could be no question by this time that the Tanaka memorial was real. It was just too good a copy of what Prime Minister Tanaka had said and what the supernationalists had been saying for months to be otherwise. Japan was preparing to surge forward on her drive for empire. The stage was set and the characters knew their roles.

Kaku Mori was the eminence grise of Japan. His official title was only Parliamentary Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, which previously had been of very little importance. But Mori was the power of the ruling Seiyukai party and he controlled General Tanaka. When Mori assumed his insignificant office he called the foreign ministry's officials together and announced that he intended to "get tough with China." How could that be, when Prime Minister General Tanaka was in charge? For one thing, Mori had connections with many supernationalists who wanted Manchuria. These included General Teiichi Suzuki, the prime minister's right-hand man, and Yosuke Matsuoka, then an official of the South Manchurian railway. Many of the zaibatsu were taking an interest in exploitation of Manchuria in the middle 1920s, too. Mori, the power of the Seiyukai, was in touch with all these people, and with the leaders of the Kwantung Army, and was conducting machinations to take over Manchuria. In the spring of 1927 Mori had forced General Tanaka to send troops of the Kwantung Army to Shantung Province, "to protect Japanese life and property." Tanaka had objected.

{p. 63} "If Tanaka will not assent to sending the expeditionary force," said Kaku Mori, "I'll make him resign from the presidency of the Seiyukai."

So Tanaka sent the troops. Kaku Mori, from his seat of obscurity, was, in effect, running not only the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but also the government.

General Tanaka was trying to negotiate with Marshal Chang Tso-lin, the warlord of Manchuria, for further Japanese control of railroads and enterprises. The marshal was, however, bemused by his own problems, chief of which was the steady march northward of Chiang Kai-shek's expeditionary force, which aimed to unite China under the Nationalist flag. The marshal, along with several other warlords of the north and west, was going to have to join up or fight.

Prime Minister General Tanaka had seen the trend - that Chiang was sweeping the warlords away. He was really interested in maintaining the marshal as ally and instrument in Manchuria, and he sent emissaries to Peking, where the old marshal lived, to persuade him to give up the ancient northern capital of China and retreat to Mukden, in the hope that Chiang would be satisfied to conquer north China and would not move beyond the Great Wall.

Marshal Chang refused to retreat.

Negotiations and machinations continued. In the spring of 1928 Chiang Kai-shek's expeditionary force moved up into Shantung Province, augmented by the armies of warlords Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan, who had joined up. Some 19,000 Japanese were still living in Tsingtao, along the railroad and in Tsinan.

Major Takashu Sakai, the Japanese military attache at Tsinan, cabled Tokyo demanding troops be sent to protect the Japanese citizens. The war ministry in Tokyo had reservations, and so did General Tanaka. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had visited Tokyo that previous winter and had assured the Japanese that he was breaking off his relations with the Communists and the Soviets, who had been supporting his revolution but who had now become troublesome. General Tanaka believed that and did not see that there was any immediate danger.

But Mori insisted, and so once more troops were dispatched to China, 5000 soldiers of the Kwantung Army. They were supposed to remain in Tsingtao, but Japanese military attache Sakai informed Colonel Fukuda, commander of the force, that hundreds of Japanese had been killed in Tsinan. The real figure was thirteen Japanese ...

{176} Diplomatic relationships between the USSR and Japan hit a new low when the Japanese signed the Anti-Comintern pact. The most telling clauses of the pact were "secret," or so the Japanese believed. They did not know that the Japanese foreign office was

{p. 177} infiltrated by spies of the Richard Sorge ring, which was believed by the Germans to be a German espionage organization but was actually reporting all to the Soviets.

After the Anti-Comintern pact was signed, the Russians showed their displeasure with Tokyo by refusing to renew a fisheries agreement which was very important to the Japanese economy.

In this atmosphere of tension, a border dispute suddenly loomed very large. It concerned the Amur River, the traditional border between Siberia and Manchuria. The exact delineation had never been clear nor very important during the days of China's empire. But with Manchukuo a Japanese dependency, the situation changed. The Japanese claimed that the boundary lay on the north side of the sandbar island of Kanchas. The Soviets claimed that it lay on the south bank.

On June 19, 1936, a Soviet army unit landed on the island. General Tojo rushed a Japanese mechanized unit to the Amur River. The Soviets sent reinforcements down.

The incident was settled with no more than a minor clash by negotiation between the Soviet foreign office and the Japanese ambassador, and the Soviets withdrew their troops. But the issue was not really resolved, it was just that the Soviets had other matters in mind just then. In response to the Anti-Comintern pact, the Soviets signed a nonaggression pact with China and began sending military aid.

This action infuriated the Japanese, but General Tojo was occupied with his foray into Inner Mongolia, and then Japan became so entangled in the China war that the Soviet question was put aside.

Put aside, but not forgotten, had to be the reality. For General Tojo was a man of whom it was said "he never learns and he never forgets." General Itagaki also belonged to the group that expected war with the USSR. That concept was a part of the Kwantung Army's philosophy.

In the winter of 1938 the Japanese leaders proposed a National General Mobilization Bill, which would mobilize the entire resources and people of Japan under government orders, any time the prime minister declared a national emergency. This meant tighter press controls, price controls, wage controls, curtailment of the right to strike. It meant the tightening of the laws against sedition, which could be invoked on almost any pretext. Anyone who criticized the Japanese army in print might expect to be arrested. It also meant national registration of all citizens, higher taxes, and compulsory

{p. 178} savings programs. Some members of the Diet protested that this bill would completely destroy the last of Japanese freedoms. Nevertheless, it was passed in March. At the same time, the government became more active in enforcing the laws governing expression of ideas and associations of citizens. The Japanese were now under central government control in nearly every aspect of their lives.

{p. 179} The army pressed the foreign office to obtain the disputed territories along the Soviet-Manchukuo border. In Moscow in July, Ambassador Mamoru Shigemitsu presented Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov with a demand for transfer of disputed territories to Manchukuo and Japan (in the case of territory next to Korea). On receipt of this demand the Red Army instructed the forces in Siberia to occupy the lands to which the USSR laid claim. On July 13 Russian border troops took positions on Changkufeng Hill. The Japanese troops of the Korea army sped to the scene but did not attack. The Soviets, unopposed, withdrew from the hill. At the same time, War Minister Itagaki asked the emperor to approve an offensive against the Soviets in the region of Lake Khasan, which Itagaki declared was poorly defended. The idea was to push in with the military and then force the Soviets to give up the territory at the bargaining table.

The supercabinet, now dominated by the army, met to discuss this subject and on July 22 agreed to reinforce the northern border. Imperial General Headquarters, however, suggested that they go slowly. The offensive against Hankow on the central China front was at its height and commanded a growing percentage of the Japanese resources. The Japanese Nineteenth and Twentieth divisions were sent north, with an infantry brigade, three machine gun battalions, a cavalry brigade, tanks, and seventy aircraft. On July 27 these forces were in place along the disputed border. The Soviets occupied another hill north of Changkufeng. (These hills were called Zaozernaya and Bezymyanaya hills by the Russians.)

On July 29, while Ambassador Shigemitsu was talking to Foreign Minister Litvinov in Moscow about the disputed territory, the Japanese attacked. It was reminiscent of the opening of the Russo-Japanese War, except that this time the results were quite different. The Japanese captured their hills and inflicted casualties on the Soviet border forces.

The Japanese troops had orders from Imperial General Headquarters to halt on the border and go no farther. But the Japanese commanders were heady with victory. Also they had before them the illustrations of the Kwantung Army's success in defying Tokyo's

{p. 180} authority and also the success of the China armies, and the knowledge that War Minister Itagaki and Vice Minister Tojo fully supported their aims. So the Japanese began to move again, their next objective was the Posyet area, which would put them in a position to threaten the naval base and port of Vladivostok. The Soviets called up the 32nd Division, the 40th Division, and the 2nd Motorized Brigade. These were supported by armored units and artillery and aircraft.

On August 6 the Soviets launched an offensive that drove the Japanese completely out of Soviet territory in three days. Five hundred Japanese soldiers were killed and nearly a thousand wounded. Ambassador Shigemitsu asked for a cease-fire and mutual withdrawal, and the Soviets, concerned with their own troubles in European Russia, were eager to agree. What the Korea and Kwantung armies had hoped would be a major Japanese military action fizzled out completely. What nobody seemed to see at that point was the pattern of Japanese aggression:

Make the attack; if it succeeds, proceed; if it fails, withdraw and pretend it was all a mistake of overenthusiastic subordinates. This policy had worked at Port Arthur, failed in the 1928 assassination of Chang Tso-lin, worked in the Manchuria incident and the two 1937 invasions of China, and failed in southern Siberia.

When the emperor was advised of the ill-fated expedition, he grew furious with War Minister Itagaki and reprimanded him personally for misleading the throne.

"Abominable," he called the army's recent conduct. "Not one soldier is to be moved again without the express permission of the throne," he told the war minister. If only he had been able to sustain his anger, the army still might have been brought under control. But by nature Hirohito was a mild-mannered man, and he soon cooled down. He was now almost entirely surrounded by sympathizers with the army, and so the words he was getting tended to play down the excesses of the militarists.

General Tojo now overreached himself. Holding a procurement meeting with representatives of Japan's industrial council, the deputy war minister spoke to these millionaire industrialists as though they were junior officers. He laid down the law to them about what they were going to have to produce. He also warned them that Japan's enemies were the European nations and the United States, and particularly the Soviet Union. Japan must be prepared to go to war with

{p. 181} the Soviet Union. If the industrialists were not prepared to support the army's view, the army would make sure they did so in the future.

General Tojo and General Itagaki were prepared to go to war with the USSR just then, but the emperor, Premier Konoye, the Supreme Military Council, and the industrial powers of the nation were not so prepared. Tojo's remarks made the newspapers in Japan and abroad and the uproar was immediate. "Japanese General Predicts War with Russia" was a London headline.

The American ambassador called at the foreign ministry to ask questions. General Ugaki, the foreign minister, spent the next week trying to explain these hostile remarks. General Itagaki, the minister of war, had to field questions in the Diet about the Tojo belligerence to the industrialists and his threats to the USSR.

Tojo had to go.

Quietly he was removed from the war ministry in December 1938 and assigned as inspector general of the army air forces, a job in which his technical military skill would be paramount and his political opinions submerged. There is no doubt that he took the blame for opinions that were shared by his superior, General Itagaki.

The China war dragged on. Japan now had committed 1.6 million men to the China fronts, and they were winning victories, although the casualties in these famous Japanese banzai charges were very heavy. They captured Hankow on the Yangtze front and Canton in the south, but the Chinese simply melted behind the victorious Japanese armies, formed up again, and attacked somewhere else.

Having burned the diplomatic bridge that had connected Japan to the Chiang Kai-shek Nationalist government, the Japanese began to work in the fall of 1938 to organize a new Chinese government, with its capital at Nanking. They negotiated secretly with Wang Ching-wei, one of the original leaders of President Sun Yat-sen's Republic of China. Wang had grown restless recently, in the cooperation between Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Communists who controlled most of the countryside of north China, even as the Japanese held the cities and the railroads. In December 1938, Wang and his wife left Chungking and traveled down to Hanoi in Indochina. From there Wang sent a cable to Chiang Kai-shek asking him to end the war against Japan immediately and fight the Communists instead.

{p. 182} Chiang rejected the proposition instantly, the Kuomintang branded Wang "traitor" and put a price on his head. Wang then went up to Shanghai, met the Japanese there, and went to Tokyo for talks. There the Japanese government leaders explained their plans: they proposed to build a new Asia, around the combination of Japan, Manchuria, and a New China. It would be the New Order of East Asia.

In January 1939, Prince Konoye was so discouraged with the prospects of finding a route to peace in China, and so tired of fending off the army's constant demands for money and power, that he resigned, as he had been threatening to do for months. He was replaced by Baron Kiichiro Hiranuma, an ultranationalist, who lasted until August 30, 1939. He was replaced by General Noboyuki Abe, who lasted until January 16,1940. He was replaced by Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai, a moderate, who lasted until July 22, 1940. All these cabinets faced the same problem: the growing power of the militarists in army and navy.

There were differences in degree and approach in all these cabinets, but the one fact stood out: no matter the cabinet, from 1937 on, the march of militarism was steady and speedy. In February 1939, the Japanese navy occupied Hainan Island, off the south coast of Kwangtung Province of China. The French, whose Indochina colony was directly threatened by the move, were unable to do a thing about it: their fleet, had they chosen to send it to the Pacific in its entirety, would have been chopped up by the Japanese.

In China, the war continued. The General Headquarters of the China Expeditionary Army was established at Nanking under General Juzo Nishio, a former commander of the Kwantung Army. But the China army now faced a new problem - the policing of this enormous area of China that they had seized, in the absence of a civil government. General Nishio had to ask for more troops and still more troops. The result was that the Tokyo authorities had to dip into their reserves which had been saved to prosecute a war against the USSR. The Itagaki policy of fighting the Soviet Union had to be abandoned.

In the spring of 1939, the Kwantung Army was still secretly committed to an attack on the Soviets. In April, new regulations to govern the Kwantung Army's conduct vis-a-vis the Russians were forced on the army. They called for an evenhanded approach, "never to invade and never to be invaded." That high-sounding statement

{p. 183} obviously came down from Tokyo. But the rest of the policy was much less placid. If the Soviets crossed the border they were to be "annihilated" (a common Japanese military term of excess). Where the borders were not precisely known, the area defense commander had the final decision as to what action would be taken.

This time, in 1939, the Kwantung Army decided it would launch a probe into Outer Mongolia to see what would happen. Under the Kwantung Army's "Principles for the Settlement of SovietManchurian Border Disputes," if the assault failed, then it could be regarded as a local mistake. The policy had worked before, if the results had not always been to the army's liking.

The place chosen was the Kalkha River area, which separated Outer Mongolia from Manchukuo in the Homonhon region. The Japanese said that the line ran along the Kalkha, which flows into Lake Buir Nor. The Soviets and Outer Mongolians said that the border lay thirty kilometers to the east of Homonhon.

The Japanese saw their chance when a small Mongolian cavalry unit crossed the river. The Manchukuo border guards immediately attacked and drove them back. The Mongols then built a bridge across the river to establish their rights. The Kwantung Army appeared on the scene and crossed over into Mongolia. A large Mongol force attacked the Japanese in Mongolia and very nearly wiped out the Kwantung Army regiment involved, because the Mongols were supported by Soviet tanks and planes.

The Kwantung Army decided to launch a major blow at the Mongols and to go into Siberia to punish the Soviets. Forgotten were the "Principles for the Settlement of Soviet-Manchurian Border Disputes." The Russians would be taught a lesson and, if all went well ...

The Kwantung Army set up a plan to send 15,000 troops up to the border and across. They would be supported by antitank guns, artillery, planes, and tanks. The plan was approved by War Minister Itagaki, and the Kwantung Army marched.

The battle began with Inner Mongolian troops riding camels to fight for the Japanese against Outer Mongolian troops on their bandy-legged ponies. But very shortly it became a battle of modern armies. The Kwantung Army at first had all the best of it with its fast new aircraft bombing and strafing in support of the troops. But on June 22 the Soviets brought up a force of 150 planes and attacked the Japanese. About a third of the planes were shot down, but the Japanese ground forces were hard hit. In retaliation, the Kwantung Army

{p. 184} sent up more planes and on June 27 the Japanese attacked with 130 airraft and destroyed 100 Soviet planes, mostly on the ground at air bases. This was real escalation of the war, into Siberia, and it was done without the knowledge of Imperial General Headquarters. When the IGHQ learned of the assault, the emperor was informed and the Kwantung Army was accused of usurping the imperial prerogatives. The emperor issued a personal reprimand to the Kwantung Army. The army did not reply but its anger was enormous against Imperial General Headquarters for not backing up the troops in the field.

On July 1 the Kwantung Army launched a major attack by the Komabatsura force, which consisted of a greatly reinforced division. Across the river and into the Soviet-Mongol positions charged the troops, the company officers out front, leading with their unsheathed samurai swords. The Soviets by this time had prepared for war and had brought in their most modern weapons, including heavily armored tanks and fast planes. The samurai swords were no match for armored vehicles with heavy machine guns. The Japanese found their antitank weapons too small and were soon launching suicide squads with satchel charges to throw themselves under the enemy tanks and blow them up. The Soviets had produced far more armor than the Japanese could assemble, and the armor did the job. The Japanese took enormous casualties and failed to penetrate farther than the first few miles into Mongol territory. Their plan had been to move to the Trans-Siberian Railway, and, according to the Russians, to seize the territory from Irkutsk to Vladivostok.

The weather was extremely hot, temperatures went up to 130 degrees Fahrenheit on the Mongol plain.

"Our men were having a hard time getting even a trickle of waer," said one artillery officer. "I, myself had to spend three days without any supply of water. And when the night comes the thermometer plummets. Our men sleep on the grass and sand, trembling with cold."

By August the battle had been reduced to stalemate. The Kwantung Army asked Tokyo for a great air armada to decimate the Russian troops, but Imperial Headquarters called their attention to the regulations about border disputes, pointed out that the Kwantung Army was on the wrong side of the border, and said no.

On August 20 the Soviet forces launched their great counteroffensive. They had amassed armor and artillery far stronger than the Japanese. They attacked frontally and then brought equally large

{p. 185} forces of armor around on both sides to outflank the Japanese. The Japanese 23rd Division was virtually destroyed. Two regimental commanders burned their flags. One committed seppuku with his samurai sword. The other charged into the face of enemy fire and was killed.

The Japanese retreated and then prepared to launch a new offensive, utilizing the major elements of the Kwantung Army. The generals on the field were prepared to use every man in Manchuria if necessary. Imperial Headquarters stepped in to save the Kwantung Army from itself, for the Soviets were bringing in even more troops, big guns, and armor and planes. Tokyo was not prepared to try to wage a major war against such strength. This was particularly true when the generals in Tokyo had a report on the Japanese casualties. Japanese casualties had been an astounding 73 percent! This compared to less than 20 percent casualties in the land fighting of the Russo-Japanese War. Something certainly had changed. The Imperial General Headquarters ordered the Kwantung Army to break off contact and retreat back into Manchukuo territory. In Moscow, Ambassador Shigemitsu approached the Soviet foreign office for a ceasefire and was treated very gently, all things considered. Both sides retreated behind their borders and gave guarantees not to come out again.

The Kwantung Army was humiliated by the emperor's rebuff, and now by IGHQ: General Ueda, the commanding officer of the army, was sent back to Japan and that was the end of his career. General Rensuke Isogai was also retired from active duty. General Yoshijiru Umezu, commander of the First Army, came from Japan to bring order to the Kwantung Army. He came with a new order for the army. In the future no troops would counterattack or attack without the specific order of the commanding general of the army. Disobedience was a court-martial offense. General Tojo had controlled the Kwantung Army as he wanted to, by force of his personality. For the first time, now, the army was controlled by rules.

The opinion the Japanese generals offered the rest of the government was that the Soviets had maneuvered to prevent the Japanese from disposing of the China incident. Perhaps that tortured reasoning made it easier for the generals to live with the monster

{p. 186} they had created. In the summer of 1939, two years after General Sugiyama had promised the emperor that he could end the China incident in a month, the involvement had tied up more than half Japan's military resources and there was no end in sight.

As for Siberia, the generals had another great shock on the heels of the border cease-fire. The USSR and Germany signed a nonaggression pact, thus nullifying the effects of the Anti-Comintern alliance between Japan and Germany, which the generals had hoped would assist their designs on the Soviet maritime provinces. Two years earlier it had all seemed so easy; first China to be brought to heel, and then Russia to be defeated once again. But at the end of August 1939, the world of the militarists had turned upside down.

{p. 187} The summer of 1939 changed the world.

In July the United States slashed Japan's oil futures. The official announcement was that the United States intended to terminate its Treaty of Commerce with Japan at the end of the six months' notification period. That meant no more American oil. Without oil, neither the army nor the navy could move.

In September Germany marched into Poland, and the European war began. The implications to Japan were enormous: those who wanted to expand the enpire to Southeast Asia saw their chance coming, particularly after Britain withdrew her gunboats from the Yangtze River and her troops from Peking and Tientsin. The Japanese militarists saw more weakness here, something on which they could capitalize. But they were held back by the last of the moderates. General Abe's government, which came to office just before the European war broke out, declared that Japan would not become involved in that conflict.

The words sounded good, as though Japan was going to settle down, but the crosscurrents in Tokyo told an entirely different story. As noted, for two years Admiral Yonai and his assistant, Admiral Yamamoto, had been fighting a running battle against army excesses and against turning the navy into a jingoist organization. They had warned so many times that Japan would ultimately lose a war against the United States that their warnings were no longer heard. When General Abe took over the government Admiral Yonai's service as

{p. 188} navy minister ended. Personally, Yonai was relieved because in recent months he and Yamamoto had been receiving an increasing number of death threats, obviously from young naval officers and other supernationalists. ...

{p. 189} Japan's democracy had always been limited; the nobility and rich had always run the country, and their main opponents in the Taisho and Showa periods had been the army. Now, the Meiji Constitution had been shorn of all the slender protections offered the people, and the machinery was ready to establish totalitarian control by the government.

The promotion campaign for the Imperial Rule Assistance Association was begun that summer of 1939. Prince Konoye called on the people to join up, "to restore the spirit and virtues of the old Japan." Read that: the spirit of the old Japan, as modified by the believers in the Imperial Way.

From the beginning the Yonai government was in trouble over the burning issue of the Rome-Berlin pact. To sign meant to cast Japan's lot with the totalitarian countries of Europe, seen, perhaps more clearly in Tokyo that summer than in Washington, as the enemies of Britain and the United States. Yonai said no; Japan did not want to be part of that group. The army said yes. So did Admiral Suetsugu, General Iwane Matsui, and former Ambassador Yosuke Matsuoka, all members of the cabinet council. They resigned in

{p. 190} protest. The resignations shook Tokyo. Admiral Yamamoto stopped laughing.

Late in the spring of 1940 "the phoney war" came to an end, with the battle for Norway, the German blitzkrieg through Belgium, the fall of France, the near disaster of Dunkirk, and what appeared to be the imminence of the German invasion of England. Mussolini - "that jackal," Winston Churchill called him - hastened to join the war on Germany's side. The pressure from the Japanese militarists to join the "winner" became almost unbearable.

In June 1940, the Japanese army forced the Japanese government to demand that Britain close the Burma Road, over which China was receiving its slender supply of war materials. Facing possible invasion, the British could not spare an iota of energy in Asia, so they acceded for three months. Once again, this agreement to an outrageous demand only whetted the appetite of the Japanese militarists, who could now see themselves as the inheritors of the British empire in Asia.

Two days after the British agreed to close the Burma Road the Japanese army in China closed in around Hongkong, ready. The army agitated: Japan must join Germany and Italy before their world victory. Only thus could the Japanese expect to share in the spoils.

The end of June found Admiral Yonai's government in shambles. Colonel Hashimoto, whose attempted coups and murderous plots were by now legendary in Japan, tried another: the police learned of it just in time and seized thirty-eight young men who were planning to kill the prime minister and a number of the elder councillors to the emperor as "hindrances to Japan's fulfilment of her destiny." Once again, Colonel Hashimoto, the gunner of the Yangtze, got off scot-free.

By mid-July 1940, the Japanese army was prepared to seize power. War Minister General Hata told Prime Minister Yonai that the army now insisted on an end to political government, and that he was resigning to force the issue. On this rock the Yonai cabinet capsized. This time the emperor's senior councillors had virtually no choice: they could have Prince Konoye, who was acceptable to the army, or they could have an army prime minister. Period.

The emperor chose the least dangerous: Konoye. But even then, he lost.

Prince Konoye came to power this time with several under-

{p. 191} standings with the army: Japan would ally herself with Germany and Italy; a planned economy would be established; Japan, Manchukuo and the New China would form an economic bloc; and all aspects of Japanese life would be subordinated to the military.

The makeup of the new cabinet gave the clues as to what was coming. The foreign minister would be Yosuke Matsuoka, negotiator of the Anti-Comintern pact with Germany, a prime mover in the plot against Manchuria, and perhaps Japan's number one America-hater. Matsuoka had grown up on the West Coast of the United States and had been subjected to some of the American racism against Orientals. He had also gone to college at the University of Oregon, where he apparently fine-tuned his hatred of things American.

The war minister would be General Hideki Tojo, one of the prime advocates of war with the Soviet Union, and Matsuoka's longtime associate in the manipulation of Manchukuo. Prime Minister Konoye had not even made the gesture of asking the army to submit a list of names, as had been the custom in the old days. He told General Hata to pick his own successor, which meant that the board of generals who controlled the army would pick the man. It had to be someone who could control the army, said the prime minister. Tojo had controlled the Kwantung Army, and as assistant war minister he had gained the confidence of his fellow generals. Tojo was just then busily building up the army's air force installations in Manchuria, with an eye to developing a strength that would overcome the Soviet air forces the next time they met the Japanese.

The navy minister would be Admiral Kashiro Oikawa, a mild scholarly admiral, whose major claim to fame was his attempt to constantly please everyone. Consequently, everyone, inside the navy and out, knew that he would blow with the wind.

In June, Prince Konoye came down to Tokyo from his summer villa at Karuizawa to resign as president of the Privy Council and once again take on the responsibilities of prime minister.

Japan was ready for new military adventures. In the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, she had created the mechanism to bring "The New Order" to Asia. The Imperial Rule Assistance Association was now going to replace all the political parties and help the cabinet rule the country. One by one all the political parties would disband.8

This new Konoye cabinet brought totalitarian control to Japan.

With France and the Netherlands now German colonies, the glitter of Indochina and the Dutch East Indies attracted the Japanese.

{p. 194} On September 22, 1940, Japanese troops crossed the border from China into Indochina.

The reaction from London and Washington was swift. Britain immediately announced the reopening of the Burma Road to China, giving Chiang Kai-shek back his lifeline to the West. The United States announced an embargo on iron and steel scrap exports except to nations of the Western Hemisphere and Britain. Japan, the largest importer of American steel, would get no more.

On September 27, 1940, Japan, Germany, and Italy signed the Tripartite Pact and the pictures of the event circled a world that was now firmly divided into three major camps: the totalitarians of Germany, Italy, and Japan, with their peace pacts to keep the Soviet Union from interfering while they dismembered the rest of the world; that world, the new German colonies of Europe, the old colonies of Africa and Asia, and the undeveloped republics of Latin America; and, third, the disorganized English-speaking peoples, with the most powerful military element, the British empire, already under siege.

{p. 202} ... But the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo pact now came home to haunt the Japanese. Once Hitler invaded Russia, they were afraid to ignore the pact. What if Hitler won without their assistance? Then they would have the Germans on their northern border. What if Hitler also occupied England? Then they would have to deal with Hitler over the British colonies in Asia.

The Germans, having failed to "blitz" the Soviets, now demanded with increasing shrillness that Japan attack Siberia. Foreign Minister Matsuoka favored this course. But the army wanted to occupy Indochina. When Prime Minister Konoye sided with the army high command, Foreign Minister Matsuoka knew he was defeated. The next step was to secure the approval of the War Council, which consisted of the field marshals, fleet admirals, war and navy ministers, and army and navy chiefs of staffs, plus some other admirals and generals appointed to the council by the emperor. This council was then to approach the emperor and persuade him to its point of view. Matsuoka played his last cards: he warned that to get involved in the south would lead to serious consequences with the United States, while to attack the USSR might not mean anything to the United States, which was anti-Communist. He so argued at a conference of the government military liaison forces. General Muto, chief of the

{p. 203} army Bureau of Military Affairs, said they must go south, to guarantee a supply of rubber and tin. Navy Chief of Staff Osumi Nagano said all the preparations had been made to invade Indochina. To go north would delay action for fifty days. The plan now was to move first into Indochina, and then farther, into Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies, step by step, hoping, of course, that Japan could swallow these chunks of territory without arousing the sleeping eagle - the United States, which was the only power uncommitted to the European war and thus free to take on Japan if it would.

On July 2, 1941, another Imperial Conference was called, and this one was so important that the emperor appeared, to hear the discussion of the document "Outline of National Policies in View of the Changing Situation." The policy was the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The method: preparation for war against the United States and Britain. The immediate new move: investment of all of French Indochina.

Privy Council President Yoshimichi Hara said he was worried about war with the United States. Foreign Minister Matsuoka said that a war with the United States and Britain was unlikely if the Japanese military proceeded with great caution. "The trouble is that the officers in the front line are aggressive, convinced that we will use force. ... Of course I have sanctioned the aggressive behavior of the officers, trusting in the wisdom of the Supreme Command." But Hara was not satisfied:

"What I want to make clear is whether the United States would go to war if Japan took action against Indochina." Matsuoka: "I cannot exclude the possibility." At this point General Sugiyama, the army chief of staff, interrupted. Sugiyama had favored war with the United States for a year.

Our occupation of Indochina will certainly provoke Britain and the United States. ... At this juncture, Japan must resolutely carry out the policy she now has in mind: this policy is absolutely necessary in order to stamp out the intrigues of Great Britain and the United States. ... I do not believe that the United States will go to war if Japan moves into French Indochina. Of course, we wish to do this peacefully. We also wish to take action in Thailand but that might have serious consequences since Thailand is near Malaya. This time we will go only as far as Indo-

{p. 204} china. We will be careful in sending our troops into Indochina, since this will greatly influence our policy with regard to the South.

{p. 205} While Foreign Minister Matsuoka had failed in his bid to secure commitment for an immediate attack on the Soviet Union, the throne had indicated its support of a strong and watchful presence on the Manchurian border. Tojo took this to be an invitation to attack the USSR as soon as the military situation in western Russia would justify it. Forsaking the chance to defeat China once and for all, the Imperial General Staff began moving north and south. The decision was not clearly recognized at the time for what it was: an overextension of Japan's military resources. Tojo was committing Japan to fight on three fronts, Siberia, China, and the south. The orders were prepared to double the size of the Kwantung Army and increase its armaments commensurately. The army had 400,000 troops; it was to have nearly 800,000. Manpower was not the basic problem: The Imperial Way philosophy that had permeated the nation from top to bottom made the creation of cannon fodder easy. It was the trucks and tanks and guns, and, above all, the gasoline to run them that was the never-ending problem. Under war conditions the only petroleum available to Japan would be that of the Dutch East Indies, which they must capture.

{p. 254} Just now, in February 1942, the war had moved into what the Japanese army termed "the second phase." The Java and south Burma operations would be next. No one had expected the war to proceed so rapidly, and the army was planning to move that way in March or April. But with the Anglo-Saxons falling like gingerbread men, at the end of December Marshal Terauchi had recommended that the second phase be advanced by a month.

So it was done. The center of Japanese attention moved to the Philippines, where the Americans and Filipino troops were fighting a grudging battle down the Bataan Peninsula, to the Java Sea, where the next naval battles would be fought, and to Burma, where that lifeline, the Burma Road, connected Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist China with the outside world. Japan's most serious problem at the moment was the assimilation of all these victories.

{p. 260} The war in the Dutch East Indies was proceeding satisfactorily. The Americans had written off Java and Sumatra and their own Asiatic Fleet, and the sea command of the Allied naval forces had been given to Dutch Admiral C. E. Helfrich. Admiral Oawa had fought the Battle of the Java Sea and won; the Allied naval forces in the Pacific were reduced to a handful of scattered ships. The Japanese naval forces were tracking them down, one by one. Admiral Nagumo's carrier force had come south and raided Darwin on February 19, sinking eight ships and damaging nine. The only conceivable naval threat the Japanese could see was from the British base at Trincomalee on Ceylon, where the British Eastern Fleet lay. But that fleet's main object was to protect India and Ceylon, and its principal weapon was the light aircraft carrier Hermes. A plan was in the offing for a raid by Admiral Nagumo's carrier striking force on Trincomalee, which was expected to accomplish the same sort of damage that had been inflicted on Pearl Harbor. It would be executed as soon as Admiral Yamamoto released the striking force after the southern waters were cleared. Already it was certain that the Allies had nothing with which to stop the march of the Imperial Japanese forces through Sumatra and Java. The oil fields now belonged to Japan.

The Philippines had been captured, for all practical purposes. The Americans and Filipino Scouts who still resisted had been driven onto Bataan Peninsula, and there was no escape for them. It was simply a matter of time. All the major American bases in the islands had fallen. All that was left was the force on Bataan and the guerillas in the south, mostly in the Visayas and on Mindanao.

What now were to be Japan's military aims?

At this point in the war, the army and navy thinking diverged. The navy wanted to capture Hawaii and Australia. The plans had been drawn, even to the preparation of occupation currency and outline of occupation governments. The army operations and planning sections had looked into these ideas but rejected them. It would take too many troops to garrison Hawaii, and the line of supply was

{p. 261} too long. As for Australia, it was patently impossible; a whole continent to be occupied! Under the best of conditions it would take at least ten divisions. The army did not have the resources. Let it not be forgotten that the principal reason for everything else was the settlement of the China incident. More than two million Japanese soldiers were tied up in China. Nearly a million were waiting along the northern border for possible conflict with the USSR. Having now added Southeast Asia to the occupation areas, the army was coming to the limit of its powers of expansion. The principal war aim had to be to defeat Chiang Kai-shek, to help Germany defeat England, and to destroy the American will to carry on the war. Other problems would have to be resolved before Hawaii and Australia could be occupied.

All at the liaison meeting agreed, however, that the pressure must be kept on the Allies and that to do so the war gains achieved must be supplemented, although in a fashion that would not draw heavily on the army's resources. At the same time the defenses of the territories just conquered must be strengthened and the resources exploited to prepare for a protracted war.

What must be agreed upon at this meeting, said General Tojo, was the outer perimeter of the new Japanese empire, which was to be strengthened and protected.

What, asked General Tojo, was the navy's estimate of the date when the United States Navy would be restored enough to counterattack?

Not until December 1943, said the navy high command. The destruction of the Pacific and Asiatic fleets had made that quite sure. It might be possible, however, for the Americans to launch air attacks against Japan from the Aleutian Islands before that date.

On that basis, then, the liaison conference agreed that the army and navy would operate together to take New Caledonia, Fiji, Samoa, British New Guinea (Papua), and the Aleutian Islands. The navy would capture Midway Island. Navy and army would operate from the main southern air and army base at Rabaul in the Bismarck Islands against the southern areas. The main naval base for these operations would be Truk, and elements of the Combined Fleet would be stationed there.

This movement, army and navy officials agreed, should be ridiculously easy. In fact, said the army, they could look forward in a few months to withdrawing most of the troops from the southern

{p. 262} area, because the Allies had shown so little disposition to fight. To be left in the south would be only enough troops to establish the new perimeters. These were measured in battalions, not divisions. Five divisions now in the south would be brought back to Japan, Manchuria, and China.

Why tie up more troops? The vicrory was almost complete now, all the major war aims of November had been realized. The weakness and lack of stamina of the Westerners had been proved in Malaya. There was no indication in Tokyo that the Westerners were ever going to fight. Well, there was almost no indication. On March 1 Imperial Headquarters had reported belatedly on an air attack on Otori Island (formerly called Wake Island) by one aircraft carrier, two cruisers, and six destroyers. The Japanese claimed to have set one cruiser afire, damaged one destroyer, and shot down five enemy planes. The enemy, said IGHQ, had sunk one patrol craft and damaged some installations.

"With a view to annihilating the enemy, Navy Air Units in that region pursued him in full force, but the enemy made good his escape."

Thus Imperial General Headquarters passed off Admiral Halsey's raid on Wake Island, the first American offensive action of the Pacific War, and turned its attention to the knotty problem that had created so much difficulty and so much error in the past four and a half years: China.

General Tojo never lost sight of the main problem - resolution of the China incident at the earliest opportunity. That victory would free millions of troops from China, and the establishment of a national Chinese government friendly to Japan would bring immense strength to the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. China settled, the Philippines gone, the Americans would have no further physical interests in Asia, and it should be easy to persuade them to come to the peace table and ratify the Japanese victories.

The Japanese four-man supercabinet could agree on all these matters in March 1942, so to China they addressed their attention.

Analysis of the Chinese military situation was a task for a real expert. The Chinese had an army of some three million men. But of these only 40 percent were under control of the Kuomintang's central government. The others were warlord troops and Communist troops.

Of the 1,200,000 troops under Chiang's control, only 650,000 were directly controlled by his generals, and another 550,000 were

{p. 263} controlled by warlords who claimed loyalty to his government; the strongest force was the Szechuan army of 320,000 men. The defeat of this army would do much to end Chiang's power.

The next move, said the army planners, should be to push toward Chungking, from the south, with new divisions brought in from Malaya and the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines as soon as the victories were consolidated. In a few weeks, the whole of Burma would be occupied, from Rangoon to Mandalay and north, and the Burma Road would be totally sealed off. Thereafter China would have no contact with the outside world except by air. Already the pinch was being felt, virtually no supplies of any kind were coming into China, and the Nationalist government's currency had fallen to 2.5 percent of its prewar value. Still, Chinese morale was very high; for some reason the Chinese really believed the British and Americans would win the war. That problem, too, had to be addressed by a firm policy. The Chinese had to be shown that the white foreigners were paper tigers.

Preparations would begin now, in the spring, for the great offensive in China, to be carried out against Chiang's Szechuan Province in the fall. As the generals looked at the map of China, the future appeared bright. The little Rising Sun flags stuck in the map, from the Siberian border all the way south to Hongkong, and beyond, and inland past Peking and down on a line to Hankow, showed the enormous amount of Chinese territory under Japanese army control. But the little flags were misleading, as General Shunroku Hata, commander of the China Expeditionary Force, knew very well. In the north the Chinese Communist armies slipped in and around the Japanese installations, burning, shooting, killing by night. By day the Japanese controlled the countryside, by night it was Chinese territory. And in the south the same was true. Guerillas operated in every province. Every truck, every train had to be escorted by troops; if not they were prime targets for the guerillas. The Japanese claimed they had China in their grip; the reverse was true; they were still bogged down in a war that demanded more men and more guns and more equipment every month. By the winter of 1942 the need to "settle" the China incident - which meant complete the conquest of all China - had become so ingrained an article of faith with the militarists who controlled the army that there was no way of turning back. Once the China incident was settled, the militarists promised themselves all else would be simple.

{p. 399} The Soviet Union, having rebuffed Foreign Minister Togo, was sending huge reinforcements of troops to the maritime provinces. It was apparent that the USSR was preparing to invade Manchuria and Korea soon. From Moscow the Japanese ambassador reported that he could get no answers at all. Would the USSR renew the neutrality pact, which had just expired? He got no answer. Would the USSR accept Prince Konoye as a special envoy to discuss means of finding peace? He got no answer. He reminded Tokyo that the Allies were meeting in mid-July at Potsdam to plan for the future of the war, and the only belligerent left in the opposite camp was Japan. The Soviets were going to the meeting. What position they would take, nobody knew. The Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact had expired. But the generals, knowing their Russians, expected an attack in Manchuria. For many months the army had been moving elements of the Kwantung Army south, to south China, to the Marianas, to Taiwan, as far as Guadalcanal, on the theory that the Soviets would not attack. In recent months, as it became apparent the Germans were being beaten, the army tried to restore more strength to the Kwantung Army by moving new units up, mostly from China.

{p. 423} Japan's war against the West, then, began in 1853 when Commodore Perry and his black ships forced the Japanese to enter the modern world. Japan's response was to destroy Western colonialism, assure the equality of the colored peoples of the world, and take the leadership of Asia. She accomplished the first end; political colonialism scarcely exists at all in the world of the 1980s. She accomplished the second end: the single anomaly of South Africa attests to the end of racism as an acceptable political theory. She is now once again seeking world leadership.

{end quotes from Hoyt}

(6) Richard A. Werner shows that Japan's postwar miracle economy was a Butter-not-Guns adaptation of Nazi economic policy

Princes of the Yen

Richard A. Werner

M. E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York, 2003

{p. xi} Money is normally created by banks. It is precisely because banks did not lend that the central bank needed to inject more money directly into the economy. It would thus act as the banker to the nation - as other central banks have done before, and as, indeed, the Bank of Japan did after 1945, when banks' balance sheets

{p. xii} looked far worse than in the 1990s. This worked so well in the years after 1945 that credit growth quickly recovered and the economy boomed. But throughout much of the l990s, the Bank of Japan failed to take these tested and tried policies and failed to create enough money for a sustained economic recovery. Moreover, it has refused to lend to those who needed money most, the government and the small firms. The Bank of Japan also has had it in its power to delete the entire mountain of bad debts in the banking system without any costs to itself, the tax payer, or society at large. Yet it chose not to act. Why?

It is natural to start with the incompetence hypothesis. Incompetence may indeed explain the actions of some of the actors in this drama. The Ministry of Finance, for instance, and the political leaders during the 1990s could have created a recovery simply by changing the way they funded their fiscal expenditure. Instead of borrowing from the public by issuing bonds - thus draining the money from the economy - they could have funded the public sector borrowing requirement by direct loan contracts from banks. When banks lend, they create money out of nothing, without withdrawing it from other parts of the economy. This way, fiscal policy would not have crowded out private-sector activity yen by yen, as actually happened. Had they fully understood this, I am sure they would have used this method to create a recovery. However, this mechanism is litle known among economists, whether in Japan, Europe, or the United States.1

{note 1 on p. 281 reads: 1. As we will see, it was used by Hjalmar Schcht in the 1930s and is used frequently by developing countries. I have recommended this to the Japanese government for years. See, for instance, Werner (1994b, 1998b, 2000a, 2002d, Appendix}

{p. 1} The postwar miracle of high growth was, despite all its achievements, largely a quantitative change, one that took place within the unchanged economic and political institutions that had earlier been put into place. Today, Japan is once again at a crossroads. The crisis of the 1990s has spelled the end of the "Japanese-style" economic system as we know it. Japan is now in the process of switching to a fundamentally different form of economic organization, namely, a U.S.-style free market economy.

Back to the Future - Forward to the Past

The irony is that this system is not new for Japan. Few people are aware of the fact that free markets were almost the norm in Japan before the war. In the 1920s, the famous postwar Japanese system did not exist. Then, Japan's economy in many ways looked like a carbon copy of today's U.S. economy - with fierce competition, aggressive hiring and firing, takeover battles between large companies, few bureaucratic controls, strong shareholders that demanded high dividends, and corporate funding from the markets, not banks. Yet throughout the postwar era, Japan's economy has been the opposite: highly regulated, with cartels limiting competition, bank financing and cross shareholdings reducing shareholder power, no takeovers, and a frozen labor market with lifetime employment and seniority pay.

The peculiar nature of this postwar economic system has puzzled observers for decades. Leading economic theories indicate that only free markets can lead to success. But Japan rose within decades from developed-country status to become the second largest economy in the world without relying only on the "invisible hand" of free markets. Many theories have been advanced to explain this enigma.

{p. 2} War Economy

What changed Japan was an event that is often neglected in research on Japan, one that took place between the prewar era and the postwar era: the war itself. The Japanese economic system was created largely during World War II. Its true nature is that of an output-maximizing mobilized war economy.

Japanese corporations have been on a war footing since the early 1940s. In the early postwar era, the United States was keen to demonstrate to the world that post-occupation Japan had been reshaped in its image. In reality, with the beginning of the Cold War, the United States decided to maintain Japan's war footing and keep its wartime bureaucratic elite in power.

While Germany's minister of the war economy, Albert Speer, remained in Spandau Prison as a war criminal, his Japanese wartime colleague became prime minister and, together with his brother, governed Japan for twelve crucial years. During this period, from the late fifties to the early seventies, the wartime bureaucratic elite, still at the control levers, managed to complete the system of the "total economy" that had delivered rapid resource mobilization during the war years. Capable of servicing a far larger market than the restricted domestic economy, it had to expand overseas. The United States, interested in strengthening Japan, allowed this to happen. It was the system of a mobilized war economy that spearheaded Japan's postwar conquest of world markets.

The main reason why the extraordinary nature of Japan's system has remained unknown for so long is the ahistoric and usually counterfactual approach of many current economic theories. History provides the data set for the scientific economist to study. Ignoring history means neglecting the facts.

{p. 3} However, Japan did not use free markets to become the second largest economy in the world. This means that there is a rival capitalist economic system, based on the very visible hand of planners, that has outperformed other systems in terms of economic growth rates over a sustained period of time.

The Japanese experience also teaches that government intervention has been misunderstood so far, for it did not take the form of meddling micromanagement, as in a planned economy. Instead, Japan's wartime government officials primarily intervened visibly by conscious institutional design that was aimed at creating the right incentive structures for fast growth. Successful government intervention is about organizational design, not picking winners.

Institutional Design

Influenced by German thinkers, the war economy leaders encouraged the creation of large-scale firms. They realized that among the three stakeholders involved in large companies - management, shareholders, and employees - shareholders' aims were least in line with the planners' overall goal of fast growth. So shareholders were eliminated, managers elevated, and employees motivated through company unions and job security.

Management, freed by cross shareholdings from dividend-oriented shareholders, did not pay out profits but reinvested them. This allowed them to grow their companies and expand market share. It biased Japan's economy toward high growth.

At home, the ensuing cutthroat competition for market share had to be contained by the formation of cartels. This did not mean that competition ended; companies continued to compete to keep up their rankings within the cartel. Most importantly, there were no cartels restricting competition abroad. The world's open doors and free markets meant that Japan's growth machines wreaked havoc. In the 1960s and 1970s, one leading U.S. industry after another was eliminated. Europeans, less dogmatic about free trade, simply restricted Japanese entry. The Japanese complied - managed trade was what they were used to and trade friction never became a major issue with Europe.

The High Price of Success

The war economy system was highly successful in achieving its goal of rapid economic growth. But there was a price to pay. Worker benefits were usurped by the small minority employed by the large firms. About two-thirds of all employees still work for small firms, where they never enjoyed the lifetime employment, housing and welfare support, and big expense accounts that large firms offered. A number of mechanisms forced the majority of the workforce to underconsume and save much of their hard-earned income. These included tax incentives, high costs

{p. 4} for necessities such as food and education, high and rising land prices, and a patchy pension system.

In the race for a higher ranking in the world, goals such as quality of life and the environment, as well as individual freedom and choice, were judged lower priorities. Living conditions in Japan are still relatively poor or at least not commensurate with the country's status as the world's number two economic power. Houses are small, commuting in crowded trains often takes two hours or more, and leisure time is limited. Concentration in a few urban areas and conformity even of leisure patterns limit the quality of holidays.

At the same time, the Japanese system delivered great income and wealth equality and hence social cohesion, stability, and peace. Japan's low crime rate is still the envy of the world. ...

Hitler's Control Tool

While most of the intervention in Japan's economy took an indirect, market-oriented form, there was a control tool that was used for powerful direct intervention. However, it works in such a subtle way that today many economists would still dispute its presence. The tool is money. The wartime bureaucrats understood what money is, where it comes from, and how it could be used to control every aspect of the economy.

In Europe, the evolution of monetary economics was hampered by the backwardness of its economic system. While the Chinese emperors had already invented paper money and used it to totally control their empire in the tenth century A.D., European rulers still believed that only precious metals could be money. As a result, they were not in charge of the money supply, and hence also not in control of their countries. Gold proved cumbersome to deal with, so it was deposited with goldsmiths, who became the first bankers. A mistaken understanding of their activity led generations of politicians and economists astray as they ignored the farreaching implications of the fact that banks create money and decide who gets it. This also explains why the levers that have been manipulating the Japanese economy remain largely unknown. The war bureaucrats, on the other hand, understood the role of banks and recognized that money is the lifeblood of an economy.

{p. 5} Influenced by the methods of Hitler's central banker, Hjalmar Schacht, the leaders of the Japanese war economy turned credit creation into their most powerful mechanism for total control. They used the banking system purposely and skillfully to allocate resources to targeted industries.

Window Guidance

The credit controls used by the war bureaucrats survived virtually unchanged into the postwar era. They took the form of the extralegal and secretive "window guidance" operated by the Bank of Japan. This "guidance" consisted of direct credit allocation quotas strictly enforced by the central bank. It was at the core of Japan's postwar economic success. It also explains the success of Korea and Taiwan, where the Japanese installed the same during the war, and where the postwar leaders continued to use it.

In the 1950s and 1960s, window guidance controls became instrumental in the emerging struggle for supremacy between the powerful Ministry of Finance and the legally subordinated Bank of Japan. While the ministry won the first political battle and avoided a change in the Bank of Japan Law (which had been introduced in 1942, largely as a translation of Hitler's Reichsbank Law of 1939), the Bank of Japan remained solely in charge of window guidance. It lulled the ministry into a false sense of security by allowing it control over interest rates and downplaying the importance of quantitative credit policies. A string of Bank of Japan studies, supported by conventional neoclassical economics (which at best sees no role for credit policy and at worst simply assumes money does not exist), "proved" that credit controls were ineffective. Thus the Bank of Japan announced that they were abolished. Memories of the powerful nature of the controls faded over the years. By the 1970s, few observers were aware of the fact that while the Finance Ministry might reign, it was the Bank of Japan that ruled.

{p. 13} Externally, the military began to implement the dream of "Asia for the Asians." When they advanced beyond Manchuria into China in their quest for autarky, indications that the United States might play the trade boycott card merely confirmed their suspicions, and they accelerated the implementation of their plans.

Internally, they worked on dismantling the system of classical laissez-faire economics, which Japan had tried but found wanting. It was time to try something else. Military thinkers and reform-minded bureaucrats in Japan noticed that economists in Germany were offering a different prescription. Under the Nazi adminis-

{p. 14} tration their counsel bore fruit. Indeed, to quote British economist Joan Robinson. "Hitler had already found how to cure unemployment before Keynes had finished explaining why it occurred."18 Moreover, Japanese bureaucrats noticed that one major country had escaped the Great Depression altogether: the Soviet Union. In the 1930s, it embarked on a frantic government-led industrialization drive that was admired in many capitalist countries.

Reform Bureaucrats Pushed for a New System

In Japan, the move away from the free market economy was spearheaded by the military and the "reform bureaucrats" who had entered the ministries during times of high unemployment and had often witnessed starvation in the countryside. They were sympathetic to the critique by Japanese thinkers, such as Kamekichi Takahashi, and German economists, who censured the free market system for allowing rich shareholders to pursue profits while unemployment was endemic. ...

When hostilities with China turned into full-scale war in 1937, the military pushed through major changes under the cover of emergency war legislation, which gave the reform bureaucrats the mandate to establish a mobilized economy with strong government intervention. A new economic, industrial, social, and political structure began to emerge. When the hostilities turned into world war, even stronger legislation was used to completely reshape the Japanese economic, social, and political system. The redesigned institutional setup was to ensure that managers and employees would work toward greater output, not for the sake of short-term profits. It was a transformation that created the postwar Japanese miracle economy.

{p. 26} While Albert Speer, the German wartime economy minister, was incarcerated in Berlin's Spandau Prison, his Japanese wartime colleague, Nobosuke Kishi, became prime minister.

{p. 33} Thus instead of a steady drain on the system, as weapons production had been, exports would continuously strengthen Japan. The only limit would be the willingness of the world to put up with a country that was still at war with the world in economic terms - closed to imports and hence piling up trade surpluses as if they were war loot.

{p. 37} Their clocks gave it away, but nobody noticed: The Japanese did not set them back to zero in 1945. The official Japanese calendar counts years by the rule of the emperor. After 1945, the Showa emperor, Hirohito, took off his military uniform, in which until then he had been seen in public for most of his reign. He was given new clothes. But he remained in office. And the clocks just ticked on. Nineteen forty-five was far from zero hour. It was not even half-time of the of ficial calendar, the Showa era, which ended only in 1989, sixty-four years after Hirohito began his reign. Modern Japan can be understood much better when the entire Showa era is considered. The ascendance of the Showa emperor in the 1920s is where we must start if we want to trace the true origins of the postwar Japanese economic, social, and political system.

{p. 38} 4 The Alchemy of Banking


Conscious institutional design by the war economy bureaucrats created the structures for a growth-oriented economy. The designers likened their system to an "organism" that worked like a body. Structures alone, however, are like a body without blood. What is missing in our description is the lifeblood of an economy, the liquid that is oiling the wheels of commerce: money.

Since humans abandoned barter several thousand years ago, money has been at the center of economic activity. It is therefore not surprising to find that money, its creation and allocation, also took center stage in Japan's war economy.

Just What Is Money?

Unlike the leaders of Japan's war economy, many economists today dispute the crucial role of money. It may surprise many readers, but it is probably fair to say that many economists do not know what money is.

{p. 42} By about the thirteenth century, paper money therefore also had its debut in Europe. However, it was crucially different in its form, function, and implications from China's paper money. It was issued not by the government but by a private group of businessmen0

The Biggest Trick in History

Most crafts in medieval times were organized in trade guilds. So were the goldsmiths. At their regular meetings they must have discussed the phenomenon of a lot of gold lying idly in their vaults as many depositors used the receipts as money. They probably realized fairly quickly that they could make extra profits if they lent out the gold in the meantime. The risk of getting caught without gold was low if they helped each other in case of unexpected withdrawals.

The moment the goldsmiths lent out some of the deposited gold to earn extra interest, two things happened. First, the goldsmiths committed fraud. Their deposit receipts guaranteed that the gold was deposited with them. Their customers relied on the fact that the gold was there. But it was gone, lent out. So the goldsmiths strove to keep this from the public. As long as the public did not know or did not understand, there was no problem.

Second, new purchasing power was created. While the receipts for the gold were used to purchase goods in the economy, the gold itself, when lent out, provided someone else with additional purchasing power that had not previously existed. The total amount of purchasing power in the economy increased. The goldsmiths had expanded the money supply. But unlike in China, where the government made the decision over creation and allocation of purchasing power, in

{p. 43} Europe it was the goldsmiths who could dictate who would receive money. Though unknown to the public, the goldsmlths' actions affected everyone. As they created more money, the number of claims on scarce resources increased.

Things became even better for the goldsmiths. They found that demand for loans remained steady. When they had already lent out most of their gold, they were unwilling to let the opportunity slip to earn more interest. So they figured that they could further expand their lending by giving their borrowers deposit receipts instead of gold. Put simply, the goldsmiths could "print" money! ...

This had fundamental implications that were to change the course of history, for it meant that the allocation of new purchasing power was not under the control of the government. Europe's monarchs did not see through the deception. They naively believed that the bankers had large amounts of gold. When governments needed money and could not raise taxes further, they too thought they had to borrow from the bankers.

The irony was that the bankers were just doing what the kings could have done themselves: issue paper money. Yet because the monarchs came to rely on their bankers to fund large ventures, ultimately the bankers gained great influence over national policies. Wars are a prime

{p. 44} cause of borrowing and national debt. In times of war even the thriftiest prince would be in need of money. Was it surprising if, in exchange tor their invaluable services, bankers would ask not only for interest payments but also for special privileges, rights, titles, and lands? If the monarch was recalcitrant, his war fortunes could suddenly falter. Those bankers would do particularly well who had connections to colleagues in other countries, including to bankers on the other side of the front lines, who funded the ruler of the enemy country. Then the temptation must on occasion have arisen to collude with the enemy's bankers, because such "rational" behavior would maximize their joint benefit. Together, they could then decide which king was going to win - the one who had granted them the greatest privileges. They could simply issue more money to their favorite and, with deepest regrets, report to the other that they had run out of cash. ...

While Kublai Kahn and his predecessors were absolutely in control of their country through their control of the money supply, in Europe it was the reverse: The rulers came to be controlled by money and by those who were in charge of its issuance. Not the kings, but their financiers were in charge. ...

On the surface things seemed to change when central banks were introduced. These institutions, usually founded and owned by the most influential bankers, had received the monopoly rights to print paper money.14 Thus all other banks became dependent on them.

{p. 52} How could one expect the U.S. Federal Reserve system, the Bank of England, and the German Reichsbank to serve the public interest when in fact they were partly or wholly owned and controlled by private bankers?9 And closer to home the question was pressing: How could the Bank of Japan be left a joint-stock company, in large part in private hands?

In line with the German economists whose books they had studied, the Japanese war economy theorists believed that the central bank should be controlled by the government.

{p. 54} In 1942, the war leaders brought the Bank of Japan directly under the control of the government and its finance ministry by translating Hitler's new Reichsbank Law of 1939 and introducing it as the new Bank of Japan Law.21 Together with the capital flow and foreign exchange control laws, this completed the system of financial controls.

{p. 80} Two promising young Ministry of Finance officials, members of the small career-track elite, joined the increasingly outspoken and critical debate about the future of Japan's economic system. Both had taken time off from MoF for a stint in academia. One was Yukio Noguchi, who has ever since remained in academia, and the other is Eisuke Sakakibara, who subsequently rejoined the ministry and rose to become vice minister of finance in 1997. Twenty years before, in 1977, in a pathbreaking article ("Analysis of the MoF-BoJ Kingdom") in the highbrow magazine Chlo Koron, Noguchi and Sakakibara were the first and only public figures to clearly identify and acknowledge the true nature of Japan's economic system. They called it the "wartime system for total economic mobilization."

Noguchi and Sakakibara correctly pointed out how the Japanese economy was far more market-oriented in the 1920s, how the control bureaucrats had introduced the postwar system during the war, and how this mobilized economy had remained fully in place in the postwar era. They also felt that this system could not continue to function with the current international environment. To them, the slump of the mid-1970s seemed evidence that the wartime system was "on the point of collapse." "From our standpoint, the wartime system for total mobilization of economic resources is at last coming to an end, and from now on we must grapple with the real task of postwar reconstruction." Not considering the possibility of a reform that might preserve some of the obvious advantages of the system, they instead called for a fundamental transformation of Japan's economic, social, and political system in the image of the United States.

The reality was that this system was far too successful to be abandoned easily. It had created many beneficiaries, such as business groups, powerful bureaucrats, and intermediary politicians, but also including the majority of the Japanese population, whose living standards had risen rapidly. In the end, the deep shock of the 1970s was not big enough to be able to say good-bye to the war economy. Noguchi therefore had to repeat his "farewell to the war economy" nearly twenty years later.

{end of quotes from Werner} More at werner-princes-yen.html.

(7) China and Australia compared to National Socialist Germany

Werner shows that Japan's Central Bank deliberately abandoned the Miracle economy, whose equality was rightly called socialist.

But that economic system was imperial rather than national, just as Hitler's orientation was imperial rather than national.

The burden of economic conquest abroard forced Japanese to work extra hard at home, while those on the receiving end overseas saw themselves becoming mere quarries, foodlands, and tourist destinations for Japan Inc, much in accord with Hitler's blueprint for the Ukraine.

The US and Australia are becoming mere quarries and markets for industrial exporting countries. And worse, our populations are being dumbed down.

Werner does not cover the new Chinese economy. But after Mao died, Deng Xiao-Ping visited Japan. He was so impressed, that he decided to adapt the Japan Model for China. Deng also received assistance from Lee Kwan Yew and overseas Chinese in developing the China Model.

With its single-party system, China today has some resemblances to National Socialist Germany.

Henry C. K. Liu compared the two, in his article Nazism and the German economic miracle: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Global_Economy/GE24Dj01.html.

He wrote:

"After two and a half decades of economic reform toward neo-liberal market economy, China is still unable to accomplish in economic reconstruction what Nazi Germany managed in four years after coming to power, ie, full employment with a vibrant economy financed with sovereign credit without the need to export, which would challenge that of Britain, the then superpower. This is because China made the mistake of relying on foreign investment instead of using its own sovereign credit. The penalty for China is that it has to export the resultant wealth to pay for the foreign capital it did not need in the first place."

But China did this in order to gain Technology Transfer, just as the USSR commissioned Western industrial companies to build facilities in Russia, and imported high technology products with a view to cloning them: sutton.html.

The foreign reserves it accumulated through such trade have allowed China to buy energy and resource assets abroard. Hitler's Germany traded industrial goods for raw materials from Russia, which it later tried to acquire by conquest.

Whereas Hitler felt a need to expand his territory, China does not. However, it jealously guards that which it has - and says it will go to war should Taiwan declare independence.

By this means, it has given the US an edge by which to undo it, should the occasion arise. A war between these two might have no winner - only losers. But just as Hitler, on discovering that he had underestimated Soviet military strength, felt he had to attack sooner rather than later, so the US might decide in relation to China.

I feel that both sides are wrong. China should let Taiwan go - why risk the whole regime for a small part it does not control anyway? And the US should give up its "open borders" economic policy, which is impoverishing it; but without retreating into the other extreme, Autarky.

China does not have the sadistic race policies of Nazi Germany, but its treatment of minorities in its western lands - eg Xinjiang and Tibet - is quite harsh. Only a week ago, SBS TV news reported that Tibetans trying to flee across the border into Nepal were shot by Chinese security guards, and left 24 hours before their bodies were recovered.

The 1950s-60s boom years were a time of Protection; tariffs in that period did not mean that there were no imports and exports, but rather than domestic producers had a home advantage. Without that, governments cannot control their economies, and without that, Democracy and Sovereignty are meaningless slogans.

Australia from the 1940s to the mid 1970s had its own type of socialist economy, with substantial public ownership and management. It was called "Left" at the time, but in the current Trotskyist thinking, all non-internationalist kinds of socialism (even Stalin's) are branded "Right" - indeed "Far Right".

Australia's socialist economy was created by the Labor Governments of Curtin and Chifley, and maintained during subsequent conservative regimes by the "agrarian socialist" policy of the Country (now renamed National) Party, which was a partner in the anti-Labor coalition.

That economy has resemblances to the German, Japanese and Chinese models.

The islander peoples eg of Papua New Guinea were very much "under the boot" of the "white" Australian administrators. "White" patrol officers kept order in the rural areas, and even adult men were addressed as "boys". Nevertheless, now that "whites" have nearly disappeared there, the locals - no longer called "natives", but "nationals" instead - fondly remember them. They were not so bad after all. Their place as economic masters has increasingly been taken by Asians. Indonesia's actions in Irian Jaya under Suharto made the Australians look mild by comparison.

Australia's own native peoples have finally been granted land tenure, as "native title" was recognised.

Finally, a word to those who protest that Hitler was uniquely the embodiment of Evil.

Don't we all have blood on our hands?

Don't Americans and Australians have the blood of native peoples on our hands?

Don't Christians have the blood of heretics, protestants, Jews, papists, Incas, Aztecs and other "pagan" native people on their hands?

Don't Moslems have the blood of "infidels" and "pagans" on their hands?

Don't Stalinists have the blood of millions from the Soviet Gulag, and the purges, on their hands?

Don't Maoists have the blood of 30 million from the Great Leap Forward, on their hands?

Don't Trotskyists have the blood of millions of people on their hands, from the Civil War; and the Class War by which they disposed of the aristocracy, the priesthood and the intellectuals; and the Red Terror launched by Lenin and defended, in a book on it, by Trotsky?

Don't Japanese have Chinese blood on their hands?

Don't Chinese have the blood of Tibetans on their hands?

Don't Jews have Palestinian blood on their hands? Have they not incited the Americans into war on Arab and Islamic regimes? And weren't Jews (a different faction, perhaps) responsible for introducing Bolshevism and creating the USSR, even though they later became its victims?

Finally, the native peoples. Did not they, too, practice war? Did they acquire their territories by bestowal from the spirits (gods), as they imagine, or is it more likely that each newly arriving group forcibly pushed the others aside, from favourable locations to unfavourable?

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